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Protectionism in Puerto Rico: The Impact of the Dealers'
Contracts Law on Multinational Companies Planning
Operations in Puerto Rico
I. INTRODUCTION
T he growing consumer market in Puerto Rico has traditionally at-
tracted many multinational corporations.1 These companies have ex-
panded their operations to Puerto Rico primarily through the appoint-
ment of dealers, distributors, and agents.2 To their dismay, however,
many of these companies have discovered that once the relationship
with the dealer or distributor turns sour, termination of the distributor-
ship is not only lengthy and difficult,3 but also very costly
' Over the years, multinational corporations have viewed Puerto Rico as a very attractive
developing market and found that the least costly method of distribution was through local deal-
ers and distributors. Wendell William Colon & Ramiro Luis Colon, Jr., Note, El Contrato de
Distribucton o de Agencia Comercial, 27 REV. D.P. 225, 226-227 (1968).
' Many of these manufacturers viewed Puerto Rico as an export market. Accordingly, they
were appointing distributors on an exclusive basis. Id. at 227. The dealer/distributor is one of
the most significant players in the Puerto Rican market with its heavy dependency on imports.
Arturo Estrella, El Contrato de Agencia a Representacion Comercial: Naturaleza de la Relacion,
la Terminacion del Contrato, 31 REv. CoL. AB. P.R. 241, 241 (1967) (citing GALBRAIrH &
HOULTON, MARKETING EmcIENcY IN PUERTO Rico).
' See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (involving years of litigation, includ-
ing an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court); La Playa Santa Marina, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Corp., 597
F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1979) (evidence sustained an award for goodwill of the Dealer's business as
well as a statutory award equal to five times the annual average net profits); DeMoss v. Kelly
Services, Inc., 493 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1974) ("The availability of temporary relief under
Article 3A [the Dealers' Contracts Law of Puerto Rico] is not tied to a showing of irreparable
injury . . . "). Tamachi, Inc. v. Chrysler Plymouth of de Ponce, 651 F. Supp. 1359, 1360 n.1
(D.P.R. 1987) (principals cannot impair dealership contract or refuse renewal without just cause);
Francisco Garraton, Inc. v. Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co., Inc., 559 F.Supp. 405, 409 (D.P.R.
1983) (public policy requires that temporary relief be granted liberally); Felix A. Rodriguez, Inc.
v. Bristol-Myers Co., 281 F.Supp. 643 (D.P.R. 1968); San Juan Mere. v. Canadian Transport Co.,
108 P.R. Dec. 211 (1978) (establishing a market and client base legally justifies award of dam-
ages to a terminated dealer).
' See La Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d at 4 (where dealer in the prior two years had a
total net profit of $7,515.90, he is entitled to an award of $10,000.00 for goodwill plus
$18,789.75 representing five times the average annual profits of dealership for statutory damages);
Computec Systems Corp. v. General Automation, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 819, 828-829 (1984) (ex-
penses in training the personnel and sales not yet closed but pending may be included in damag-
es). Due to the length and expense of litigation most Law 75, cases are settled out of court.
Estrella, supra note 2, at 251. Also large multinational corporations would prefer to settle to
avoid the negative publicity caused by an unjust termination action in court. Id.
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These difficulties result from the application of Law 75, the
Dealers' Contracts Act,5 which protects Puerto Rican dealers and distrib-
utors against termination of their distributorship agreements by U.S. or
foreign companies.' The Act reflects the protectionist attitude toward
local businesses in Puerto Rico. Successful defenses against wrongful
termination actions brought by dealers under the Dealers' Contracts Act
are rare because of the Act's narrow definition of "just cause".7 Fur-
thermore, Puerto Rican courts liberally construe the Act in favor of
local dealers and distributors Judicial interpretation and the Act itself,
therefore, weigh heavily in favor of the dealer claiming wrongful terni-
nation and deprivation of his livelihood by the multinational manufactur-
Act No. 75 of June 24, 1964, P.R. LAWS ANN. fit. 10, §§ 278-278d (1975 & Supp.
1990) [hereinafter Law 75 or the Act].
6 The development and growth of the import and export market in Puerto Rico justified the
Act, which not only benefitted distributors within Puerto Rico, but also alerted Puerto Rican
manufacturers to the problems that they may encounter in appointing distributors overseas.
Estrella, supra note 2, at 250. The legislative history of the Act includes the following state-
ment of motives:
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico cannot remain indifferent to the growing number
of cases in which domestic and foreign enterprises, without just cause, eliminate their
distributors, dealers, or agents, or without totally eliminating them, gradually reduce
and impair the extent of their previously established relationship, as soon as these
distributors, dealers or agents have created a favorable market and without taking into
account their legitimate interests. The Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico declares
that reasonable stability in distribution relationships in Puerto Rico are vital to the
economy of the country, to the public interest, and to the general welfare, and in its
exercise of the police powers, considers necessary to regulate those relationships, the
abuses caused by certain practices.
1966 P.R. LAws 332 (translated from Spanish by the author).
' Paul Salamone, Puerto Rico's Distributor's Law 75: A Primer, 18 REv. JUR. U. 67
(1983) (discussing what constitutes "just cause" for termination under the Act); Carlos A. Rodri-
guez Vidal, The Concept of Just Cause for the Lawful Termination of a Dealership Under the
Dealers' Contracts Law of Puerto Rico, 58 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 261, 261-83 (1989) (purpose and
meaning of "just cause," history and case law); Salvador Antonetti Zequeira, A Different Opin-
ion About Just Cause, 58 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 625, 626-33 (1989) [hereinafter A Different Opinion]
(urging a narrow interpretation of "just cause" because of possible adverse effects on Puerto
Rico's trade resulting from strict construction).
* La Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d at 4 (alleged distributor's violations did not substantial-
ly affect the interests of the principal, and the termination was without just cause); Whirlpool
Corp. v. U.M.C.O. Int'l Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (although allowed by the
contract, a manufacturer cannot change the credit terms to the distributor if such a change would
result in the demise of the relationship); See Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp.,
623 F. Supp. 912, 918 (D.P.R. 1985) (expressed expiration date of the contract is void as
against public policy); Pan American Computer Corp. v. Data General Corp., 562 F. Supp. 693,
696 (D.P.R. 1983) (the Act is not unconstitutional where manufacturer knew or should have
known that his freedom of contract was limited by the existing law).
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er,9 and principals, found to have terminated agreements without just
cause, will be liable for extensive damages under the Act."0
As a result of pressure from local dealers and distributors claiming to have been wrong-
fully terminated by the manufacturers, the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce began a study in
March, 1964. Memorandum from Justo Pasto Rivera, President of the Puerto Rico Chamber of
Commerce, to All Members Affected by Wrongful Termination (Mar. 4, 1964) (on file with the
author). The memorandum instructed the members to complete a questionaire to be used as the
basis of the survey. Ma. The results of the survey showed that over fifty major distributors and
agents claimed to have been wrongfully terminated. See Camara de Comercio de Puerto Rico,
Estudio Sobre la Ley 75 de 24 de Junio de 1964 que Reglamenta los Contraros de Distribucion,
Exhibit 20 (1973). The results of the survey presented a negative image of multinational corpora-
tions and implied that Puerto Rican dealers and distributors were being terminated by foreign
manufacturers in bad faith. In a letter directed to the Senate of Puerto Rico, the President of the
Senate's Commission on Industry and Commerce stated:
Recently, the problems created in the distribution system by the untimely actions of
domestic and foreign manufacturers who, without just cause, terminate the relationship
with their distributors and agents in Puerto Rico, as soon as these distributors and
agents have created a favorable market for their products, frustrating the legitimate ex-
pectations and interests of those who so efficiently fulfilled their responsibilities ....
[It] is necessary to legislate and insure that the manufacturers will act in good faith
and not in an arbitrary manner, and preserve the distributor or agent's justified expec-
tations inherent to the relationship ....
Letter from Ramon E. Bauza, President of the Commission on Industry and Commerce to the
Senate of Puerto Rico (May 14, 1964) reprinted in 1964 SERVICiO LEGISLATIVO DE PutErTo
Rico, No. 4, at 630 (1964) (translated from Spanish by the author).
to The section of the Act dealing with the award of damages states in pertinent part:
If no just cause exists for the termination of the Dealer's contract for detriment
to the established relationship, or for the refusal to renew same, the principal shall
have executed a tortious act against the dealer and shall indemnify it to the extent of
the damages caused him, the amount of such indemnity to be fixed on the basis of
the following factors:
(a) the actual value of the amount expended by the dealer in the acquisition
and fitting of premises, equipment, installations, furniture and utensils . . . ;
(b) the cost of the goods, parts, pieces, accessories and utensils that the dealer
may have in stock, and from whose sale or exploitation he is unable to ben-
efit;
(c) the good will of the business, or such part thereof attributable to the distri-
bution of the merchandise or the rendering of the pertinent services, said good
will to be determined by taking into consideration the following factors:
(1) number of years the dealer has had charge of the distribution;
(2) actual volume of the distribution of the merchandise or the rendering
of the pertinent services and the proportion it represents in the dealer's
19931
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Many articles have been written on the subject of franchise and
dealer protection laws." The majority of these articles focus primarily
business;
(3) proportion of the Puerto Rican market said volume represents;
(4) any other factor that may help establish equitably the amount of said
good will;
(d) the amount of the profit obtained in the distribution of the merchandise or
in the rendering of the services, as the case may be, during the last five years,
or if less than five, five times the average of the annual profit obtained during
the last years, whatever they may be.
Law 75, supra note 5, § 278b.
t See, e.g., Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43
VAND. L. REv. 1503 (1990) (discussing just cause requirements for termination in franchise
agreements); Charles J. Faruki, The Defense of Terminated Dealer Litigation: A Survey of Legal
and Strategic Considerations, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 925 (1985) (surveying the most common issues
and strategies to defend dealer termination cases); Karl G. Herold & David D. Knoll, Negotiating
and Drafting International Distribution, Agency, and Representative Agreements: The United
States Exporter's Perspective, 21 INT'L LAW. 939 (1987) (discussing the role of the international
corporate lawyer in negotiating and drafting international contracts); Michael F. Hoellering,
Arbitrability of Disputes, 41 Bus. LAW. 125 (1985); Henry T. King, Jr., Legal Aspects of Ap-
pointment and Termination of Foreign Distributors and Representatives, 17 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 91 (1985) (presenting a practical checklist for those firms contemplating the appointment
of agents or distributors overseas); Monroe Leigh, Federal Arbitration Act - Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Federal Arbitral Awards - Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims
Arising from an International Transaction, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1986) (examining the en-
forceability of the Federal Arbitration Act); Barry W. Rashkover, Title 14, New York Choice of
Law Rule for Contractual Disputes: Avoiding the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L Rev.
227 (1985) (examining the enforceability of choice of law covenants); Andre M. Saltoun & Bar-
bara C. Spudis, International Distribution and Sales Agency Agreements: Practical Guidelines for
U.S. Exporters, 38 Bus. LAw. 883 (1983) (providing an overview of laws and regulations affect-
ing international sales and distribution agreements); Myra J. Gaetin & Francisco R. De Jesus
Schuck, En Torno a la Ley Numero 75 del 24 de Junio de 1964: Para Reglamentar la
Terminacion de, y la Negativa a Renovar Bajo Determinadas Circunstancias, Ciertos Contratos
de Distribucion, 34 Rev. JUR. U.P.R. 497 (1965) (discussing the effects of the Act on termina-
tion of dealerships or refusal by the grantor to renew the contract); Lisa Sopata, Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.: International Arbitration and Antitrust Claims, 7 J.
INT'L L. Bus. 595 (1986) (examining the enforceability of arbitration clauses); Rodriguez Vidal,
supra note 7 (asserting that the interpretation given by the courts to the Act's definition of just
cause is broad and encompassing in order to protect the legitimate interests and expectations of
dealers and distributors); A Different Opinion, supra note 7 (urging a narrow interpretation of
just cause because of possible adverse effects on Puerto Rico's trade resulting from strict con-
struction); Salvador Antonetti Zequeira, La Medida de los Daflos Bajo la Ley 75, 58 REv. JuR.
U.P.R. 227 (1989) [hereinafter La Ley 75] (discussing damages that a terminated dealer may
recover from the principal or grantor, and how they are established); Salvador Antonetti Zequeira,
Puerto Rico's Dealer's Act: Fourteen Years Later, 83 CoM. L.J. 453 (1978) [hereinafter Puerto
Rico's Dealer's Act] (examining major litigation concerning the Act).
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on the defense of terminated dealer litigation.12 Strategies to be fol-
lowed once a manufacturer has decided to terminate a dealer or distribu-
tor have received attention in many other articles. 3 Articles concerning
Puerto Rico's Dealers' Contracts Law in particular have focused primari-
ly on the courts' interpretation of "just cause"'4 and the awarding of
damages to the terminated dealer."
This Note highlights the issues that a manufacturer must consider
prior to establishing a contractual relationship with a dealer, agent, or
distributor that will be enforceable under the Act. To avoid the pitfalls
of Law 75, the prospective principal or grantor must understand the
historical background of the Act, judicial interpretation of Law 75, and
their effect on the contractual relationship between the principal or
grantor and the prospective dealer/distributor. Section II of this note ex-
amines the Puerto Rico Dealers' Contract Act of 196416 and subsequent
amendments, 7 as well as the legislative history and background of the
Act. This discussion illustrates the significance of the protectionist
" Kevin Scott Dittmar, Foerster, Inc. v. Atlas Metal Parts - The Wisconsin Supreme Court
Takes a Narrow View of the Dealer's Financial Interest Protected by the Wisconsin Fair Deal-
ership Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 155 (1985) (criticizing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WFDL)); Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward
a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
422 (1991) (discussing the problems encountered when attempting to enforce forum selection
clauses); Jill A. Pietrwski, Enforcing International Commercial Arbitration Agreements - Post-
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REv. 57 (1986) (ex-
plaiming how arbitration clauses can override forum selection barriers). An excellent article by
Charles Faruki discusses the issues generally in dispute in dealer contractual litigations, the bod-
ies of substantive law that apply to the disputes, and the remedies available. Faruki, supra note
11, at 927.
" Martin D. Fern & Philip Ian Klein, Restrictions on Termination and Nonrenewal of Fran-
chises: A Policy Analysis, 36 Bus. LAW. 1041 (1981); Ernest Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights - Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE LJ. 465 (1967); King, Jr., supra
note 11; La Ley 75, supra note 11; Rashkover, supra note 11; For an excellent analysis of "just
cause" and its interpretation by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, see Rodriguez Vidal, supra note
7. For a different interpretation, see A Different Opinion, supra note 7.
" See A Different Opinion, supra note 7, at 626-633 (discussing the leading cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico where "just cause" was at issue); Rodriguez Vidal, supra
note 7, at 261-283 (purpose and meaning of the concept of "just cause," history and case law);
Salamone, supra note 7, at 70-71 (defining what constitutes just cause for termination under the
Act).
I La Ley 75, supra note 11.
" Law 75, supra note 5.
17 Id
' See 1966 SERvicio LEGISLATIVO DE PUERTo Rico, No. 4, at 637; 1964 SERVIclo
LEGISLATIVO DE PUERTO Rico, No. 4, at 630; 1978 SERVICIO LEGISLAIVO DE PUERTO RICO,
No. 3, at 444; Senate Bill 643 of March 12, 1964, 18 DIARIO DE SESIONEs, pt. 3, at 1531
(1964); 18 DiARo DE SESIONES, pt.4, at 1727 (1964) (House version); 1964 P.R. LAWS 231;
1966 P.R. LAWS 332; 1978 P.R. LAWS 341; 1988 P.R. LAws 425.
1993]
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environment and legislative attitude affecting the dealer/manufacturer
relationships in Puerto Rico. Section III will compare the Puerto Rican
legislation with franchise/dealer laws enacted in other United States
jurisdictions. 9 The outcome of the cases litigated, both in local and
federal courts, will also be explored in Section III, in order to examine
the courts' interpretation of the Act, and the impact of those decisions
on multinational corporations planning to enter into contractual agree-
ments in Puerto Rico. Section IV discusses the strategies available to
principals and manufacturers to overcome the difficulties created by the
Act. This section also includes suggestions on some of the key cove-
nants that should be included in a distribution contract to insure that it
will be enforceable under Law 75.
II. MANUFACTURER FREEDOM TO CONTRACT UNDER THE DEALERS'
CONTRACTS ACT
The Dealers' Contracts Act,' also known as Law 75," was enact-
ed to protect dealers' and distributors' from unjust termination of
their contracts. Because the Act strongly favors dealers and distributors,
it can make the unwary manufacturer's life difficult. Therefore, a manu-
facturer contemplating the appointment of dealers or distributors in
Puerto Rico must be fully aware of the impact of the Act on its con-
tractual relationships.
By 1964, many U.S. manufacturers were terminating their distribu-
tion contracts with a large number of established and successful Puerto
Rican distributors.' These actions prompted strong demands for govern-
ment protection by the business community. The powerful lobbying
efforts by influential members of the Puerto Rico Chamber of Coin-
, Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. STAT. §§ 135.01-.07 (1957 & Supp. 1992) [hereinaf-
ter WFDL]; California Franchise Relations Act, CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 20025 (West 1985);
Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982) [hereinafter ADDCA].
The WFDL was selected for comparison purposes because its similarity to Law 75. The ADDCA
is selected as an example of a federal law enacted for the purpose of protecting the dealer.
Law 75, supra note 5.
21 Ley 75 is the official name in Puerto Rico.
= A dealer is "[olne who purchases goods or property for resale to final customers; a re-
tailer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (6th ed. 1990).
"' A distributor is "[a]ny individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal rela-
tionship which stands between the manufacturer and the retail seller in purchases, consignments,
or contracts for sale of consumer goods. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 475 (6th ed. 1990).
2 Gaetin, supra note 11, at 498-500. Some terminated distributors represented large multi-
national corporations: Luis Ramirez Palmer, Inc., representing Clairol (Bristol-Meyers); C.O. Meso
& Co., representing R.J. Reynolds; Colon Bros., Inc., representing American Tobacco; P.R. Sup-
plies Co., representing P. Lorrillard & Co. and Brown & Williamson; Abarca, Inc., representing
Standard Transformer;, Fernando Pont Flores, representing Ayust Laboratories. Id. at 497 n.1.
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merce, in addition to the considerable pressures exerted by the local
business community,z the Chamber of Commerce as a body, and the
Senate's Commission on Industry and Commerce,.7 resulted in the en-
actment of Law 75. The stated purpose of Law 75 is to protect dealers
and distributors from unjust termination of their contracts by manufac-
turers once the dealer/distributor has developed a market for the
manufacturer's product through his marketing efforts, advertising and
generation of goodwill.' These concerns are reflected in the Senate's
Industry and Commerce Commission Report, released during discussion
of Senate Bill 643, incorporating the proposed legislation." The Act
Many prominent members of Puerto Rico's business community testified in favor of Law
75 at hearings held on August 20-21, 1963 by the Special Committee on Commercial Relations
of the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce. Gaetin, supra note 11, at 497-500. See also Colon,
supra note 1, at 251.
' As a result of the hearings, the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce presented its recom-
mendations to the legislature. Colon, supra note 1, at 251.
" See supra note 9.
n See Statement of Motives of the Act, supra note 6. See also Informe de las comisiones,
1966 SERviCiO LEoISLA'IIVo DE PUERTo Rico, No. 4, at 637, 638. In this report of the amend-
ment to Law 75, the Senate Committee in Industry and Commerce stated:
[O]ne of the proposed amendments has the purpose of establishing with absolute
precision that the law covers not only the case of a distributor stripped of the total
distribution of a product, without just cause, but also all situations that undermine a
distribution line; that is, for example, when a distribution line consists of multiple
products, and part of the line is taken away from the distributor, or without affecting
his product line, the shipments are drastically reduced. There are many more situations
of this nature that could arise, and it must be absolutely clear that they are covered
by the law. It would be impossible to list them all.
The other fundamental amendment is contained in Article 4. "This law, by being
of a remedial nature, must be liberally interpreted so it will achieve the most efficient
protection."
Id. at 638.
" In its report to the Senate regarding the proposed Senate Bill 643, the" Senate's Commis-
sion on Industry and Commerce stated:
Recently, the problem created in Puerto Rico's distribution system has worsened due
to the abrupt actions of domestic and foreign manufacturing firms that without just
cause terminate their relationships with their distributors and agents in Puerto Rico, as
soon as these have created a favorable market for their products, frustrating the legiti-
mate expectations and interests of those that have efficiently complied with their re-
sponsibilities.
The traditional laws that regulate contracts between particulars have demonstrated
to be not efficient in protecting the legitimate interests of the distributor or agent,
which makes it necessary to legislate to regulate this relation and guarantee that manu-
facturers act in good faith, equitably, in a non-arbitrary manner and preserve the dis-
tributor or agent in the rights and justified expectations inherent to the relation. In
19931
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provides that:
Notwithstanding the existence in a dealer's contract of a clause reserv-
ing to the parties the unilateral right to terminate the existing relation-
ship, no principal or grantor may directly or indirectly perform any act
detrimental to the established relationship or refuse to renew said con-
tract on its normal expiration, except for just cause.'
In response to the ongoing lobbying efforts from the Puerto Rican
business community to expand the scope of the Act,3' the Act has been
amended many times over the years, narrowing the definition of just
cause and expanding dealer/distributor's rights."
As a result of the Act's strong bias toward dealers' and
distributors' rights, corporations planning to establish contractual rela-
tionships with Puerto Rican Dealers and Distributors must be aware that
the Act: (1) makes dealer/distributor termination difficult, and (2) often
invalidates conditions placed on the relationship.
addition, this will have the consequence of giving stability to the distribution relations.
18 DiARiO DE SEsioNEs, pt. 3, at 1531 (1964). Salamone, supra note 7, at 68. Very little debate
preceded the passage of Senate Bill 643, but extensive committee hearings, dominated by promi-
nent members of the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce and the Bar, were held. Id. n.4. See
also Colon, supra note 1, at 252-253.
30 Law 75, supra note 5, §278a.
31 See also Informe de las Comisiones, 1966 SaRvicIo LEGISLATIVO DE PuERTo Rico, No.
4, supra note 28.
' In 1965, Section 278b of the Act was amended to define, the refusal by the principal to
renew the dealer/distributor contract without just cause as a tortious act. Act No. 104 of June
28, 1965. The 1966 amendment expanded the definition of 'dealer" and of termination without
just cause. The concept of dealer was expanded to include not only the designated party, but
also the real interested or affected party. Section 278a was amended to include that "no principal
or grantor can . . . directly or indirectly perform any act that undermines the established rela-
tionship between grantor and distributor . . . . " Additionally, Section 278c was amended with
an instruction that the "waiver" clause must be given the most liberal interpretation to protect the
interests of the dealer. Act No. 105 of June 23, 1966. By Act No. 75 of June 23, 1978, the
law was once again amended to establish that dealer/distributor contracts would only be interpret-
ed in accordance with Puerto Rico law, and any agreement or covenant to the contrary would be
null and void. Furthermore, the amendment made void and unenforceable, as against public poli-
cy, any contractual covenant that would require a dealer to litigate a Law 75 dispute outside
Puerto Rico or under foreign law. Id. The most recent amendment, Act No. 81 of July 13, 1988,
permits a dealer/distributor to ignore any contractual covenants that restrict financial, managerial,
or ownership changes to the business and expanded the type of actions that, if committed by the
principal/grantor, would give rise to the presumption of termination without just cause. Md
§278a-1.
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A. Termination of the Manufacturer/Dealer Relationship
A contractual relationship which falls within the scope of the Act's
definition of a dealer contract,33 may not be terminated or impaired
without just cause?4 For instance, if the principal fails to renew the
contract upon its expiration or terminates the relationship with the
dealer/distributor, he could be liable for extensive damages if it is de-
termined that there was no just cause for termination or non-renewal?5
The definition of just cause is vague at best,' and has been the subject
of extensive litigation.37
Law 75 defines a dealer's contract as,
[the] relationship established between a dealer and a principal or grantor whereby and
irrespectively of the manner in which the parties may call, characterize or execute
such relationship, the former actually and effectively takes charge of the distribution of
a merchandise, or of the rendering of a service, by a concession or franchise, on the
market of Puerto Rico.
Law 75, supra note 5, § 278(b).
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has broadly defined the term "dealer." In Cordova &
Simonpierri Ins. Agency v. Crown American Ins. Co. of Canada, 112 P.R. Dec. 797 (1982), the
court held that an insurance agent fell within the definition of dealer because he promotes and
sells insurance contracts as a representative of the Insurance company. Id. at 803. See also San
Juan Mere., 108 P.R. Dec. 211 (anyone taking the necessary steps to gain new consumers or
create a market for a product or service meets the definition of a dealer). But cf. Mario R.
Franceschini, Inc. v. Riley Co., 591 F.Supp. 414 (D.P.R. 1984) (enterprise cannot be deemed a
dealer where it does not purchase equipment sold by the principal, nor is empowered to set sale
conditions); Cruz Ramos v. Brother Int'l Corp., 445 F. Supp. 983 (D.P.R. 1978), aff'd, without
op., 558 F.2d 817 (Ist Cir. 1978) (after lengthy litigation, the court held that a commissioned
salesman was not protected by the Act); See also Sudouest Import Sales v. Union Carbide Corp.,
732 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984).
Law 75 defines "just cause" as:
[N]on performance of any of the essential obligations of the dealer's contract, on the
part of the dealer, or any action or omission on his part that adversely and substan-
tially affects the interests of the principal or grantor in promoting the marketing or
distribution of the merchandise or service.
Law 75, supra note 5, § 278(d).
' The Act provides damages for termination without just cause which include: goodwill,
profits over a specified number of years, reimbursement for the capital investment equipment and
fixtures and other expenses. Law 75, supra note 5, § 278b. See also La Ley 75, supra note 11.
' The Act does not provide guidance as to the meaning of "essential obligations," or as to
what "actions or omissions" adversely and substantially affect the interests of a principal. Law
75, supra note 5, § 278(d).
" The continuing litigation concerning the meaning of just cause is due to the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court's failure to totally explore and define the concept. Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7,
1993]
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The courts have taken a narrow view of what constitutes just cause
for termination," and have refused to expand the concept. Further-
more, there has been considerable pressure on the Puerto Rico courts by
the local legal community to maintain a narrow interpretation of just
cause.' Under the current judicial 4interpretation of just cause,42 a
at 261. Although, the Act defines what constitutes just cause, it fails to define the acts that
could lead to a distributor's claim of unjust termination, such as impairment of the relationship.
Id. at 265 n. 14.
' See infra note 50. The concept of just cause as stated in the Act and interpreted by the
courts protects the interests of the distributors and should not be broadened. Rodriguez Vidal,
supra note 7, at 297.
" In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., the court stated that:
To add to "just cause," as was suggested, good faith, or the legitimate interests of the
manufacturer, would be to fly in the face both of the unambiguous statutory provisions
and the equally unambiguous legislative history. The fact that a dealership has become
economically highly disadvantageous is not an excusable impossibility, but is, precisely,
a contingency that the legislature sought to guard against.
423 F.2d 463, 568 (lst Cir.), rev'd, 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (reversed on other grounds).
' If the courts would broaden the concept of just cause, the results would undermine the
intent of the legislature. Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 297. But unless a more flexible inter-
pretation is given to just cause, constitutional challenges can arise in certain cases. A Different
Opinion, supra note 7, at 636. Furthermore, strict construction of just cause could have adverse
consequences to the trade in Puerto Rico. Id Inequitable laws may not only trigger constitutional
attacks but antitrust challenges as well.
4' See supra note 38.
See, e.g., Jordan K. Rand, Ltd. v. Lazoff Bros. Inc., 537 F. Supp. 587 (D.P.R. 1982)
(holding that failure by a distributor to pay royalties due, and the unauthorized use of the trade-
mark are just cause for termination). In a leading case, Marina Industria4 Inc. v. Brown Boveri
Corp., 114 P.R. Dec. 64 (1983), the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, while holding that there was
no just cause for termination, stated, in dicta, several grounds that could constitute just cause for
termination. Among them was the manufacturer's decision in good faith to totally withdraw from
the market. When faced with this same issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico: "[Whether] the
lawmakers' intent was to apply Law 75 to a principal who withdraws in good faith from the
Puerto Rican market ... or [whether] the withdrawal in good faith from the market consti-
tute[s] 'just cause' for terminating the relationship." Medina & Medina v. Country Pride Foods,
Ltd., 858 F.2d 817, 821 (1st Cir. 1988). In its certification, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
stated:
Act No. 75 of June 24, 1964, does not bar the principal from totally withdrawing
from the Puerto Rican market when his action is not aimed at reaping the good will
or clientele established by the dealer, and when such withdrawal-which constitutes
just cause for terminating the relationship-is due to the fact that the parties have
bargained in good faith but have not been able to reach an agreement as to price,
credit, or some other essential element of the dealership. In any case, said withdrawal
must be preceded by a previous notice term which shall depend on the nature of the
franchise, the characteristics of the dealer, and the nature of the pre-termination negoti-
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manufacturer must show that the dealer's breach of an essential obliga-
tion of the contract has adversely and substantially affected the
manufacturer's interests.43
Since oral agreements are valid in Puerto Rico, the Act applies not
only to written contracts, but also to oral agreements.' Furthermore,
since the Act's definition of dealer can conceivably include anyone
representing a manufacturer,45 the Act's mantle of protection extends to
dealers,46  distributors, 47  franchisees, 4' and agents.49  Hence, Law 75
will apply to a broad range of relationships not generally thought of as
traditional dealership relationships.
B. The Act's Restrictions on Appointments of Additional Distributors
or Changes in the Contractual Relationship.
In 1988, Law 75 was amended to add certain actions which create
a rebuttable presumption of termination without just cause. This new
section 0 provides, inter alia, that the appointment of additional dealers
or distributors by the manufacturer, or the establishment of facilities for
ations.
Id. at 824. See also Salamone, supra note 7, at 70 n.10 (concluding that Law 75 is geared at
protecting dealers from termination by a principal trying to take over the market, but does not
prevent a principal from terminating a distributor as a result of the principal's total withdrawal
from the Puerto Rican market).
43 For a comprehensive discussion of the court's interpretation of just cause, see infra notes
107-111.
U The courts in Puerto Rico have upheld the validity of oral agreements. See P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, §§3541-3453. See also, Puerto Rico's Dealer's Act, supra note 11, at 454. Follow-
ing the lead from Spanish commentators, the courts in Puerto Rico have held that oral contracts
will be upheld as to the original parties and their successors, regardless of the sums involved.
Id. at 454 n.6.
'5 Law 75 defines a dealer as: "[A] person actually interested in a dealer's contract because
of his having effectively in his charge in Puerto Rico the distribution, agency, concession or
representation of a given merchandise or service." Law 75, supra note 5, § 278(a).
46 See supra note 23.
47 See supra note 23.
48 A Franchisee is a "[pierson or company that is granted franchise by a franchisor."
BLACK'S LAW DICTtoNARY 659 (6th ed. 1990). A franchise is "[al privilege granted or sold,
such as to use a name or to sell products or services. The right given by a manufacturer or
supplier to a retailer to use his products and name on terms and conditions mutually agreed
upon." Id. at 658.
4 An agent is "[a] person authorized by another (principal) to act for or in place of him;
one entrusted with another's business . . . . One who undertakes to transact some business, or to
manage some affair, for another, by the authority and on account of the latter, and to render an
account of it." Id at 63.
0 Law 75, supra note 5, § 278a-1.
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direct sales or services anywhere in Puerto Rico is a breach of the con-
tractual obligation toward the dealer or distributor,5 and thus consti-
tutes termination without just cause. If it is determined that the principal
has undermined the contractual relationship by establishing parallel deal-
erships or selling directly, 2 the manufacturer or principal may be liable
for damages in an amount equivalent to the reduction in profits to the
distributor caused by the principal's actions.-3
SI Section 278a-I states:
(a) It will not be considered just cause for a violation, by the distributor, of any cov-
enant included in the distribution contract that impairs or restricts changes in the capi-
tal structure of the distributor, or management changes, or means of financing the
operation, or is designed to impair or restrict the sale, transfer, or encumbrance of any
corporate action, participative share, rights or interests owned by any person in said
distribution business, unless the principal or grantor demonstrates that the violation
may affect or has already affected adversely and substantially the interests of the prin-
cipal or grantor in the development of the market, distribution or delivery of ser-
vices;
(b) a rebuttable presumption that the principal or grantor has impaired or damaged the
established relationship [with a dealer/distributor] will be triggered by any of the fol-
lowing events:
(1) when the principal or grantor establishes in Puerto Rico, facilities for the
direct distribution of merchandise or for the delivery of services, previously
handled by the distributor,
(2) when the principal or grantor establishes a distribution relationship with one
or more additional distributors for Puerto Rico, or an area of Puerto Rico in
contravention with the existing contract between the parties;
(3) when the principal or grantor unjustifiably refuses or neglects to service the
merchandise orders sent by the distributor, in a reasonable manner and
quantities;
(4) when the principal or grantor unilaterally and unreasonably changes, to the
detriment of the distributor, the shipping methods, or terms and conditions for
payment for the merchandise ordered;
Id.
Md §278a-l(b).
' This would be the case where the manufacturer appoints an additional distributor without
terminating the original distributor's contract. In this situation, assuming the original distributor
was exclusive, the original distributor would find itself with reduced profits due to the competi-
tion from the additional distributor. La Ley 75, supra note 11, at 256-57. Section 278a-l(b)(2) of
the Act provides for recovery of damages in this situation. Law 75, supra note 5. See also
Draft-Line Corp., v. The Hon Company, affid 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 101 (lst Cir. P.R. 1993).
(the Act extends to those cases where, without terminating the dealer, the principal establishes
parallel dealerships).
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C. The Costs of Dealer Termination
The narrow statutory definition of just causeN and the restrictions
placed by the Act on choice of law5 and forum,5 6 place a manufactur-
er in the difficult position of having to litigate under adverse conditions
in a foreign forum under foreign law.' The Act makes termination of
a contract without just cause a tort giving rise to tort damages." It is
not coincidental that four days after the approval of the amendment, the
Puerto Rico Legislature approved Law No. 105 extending the reach of
the Long Arm Statute59 to include non-resident principals. As a result,
Puerto Rican distributors can file their claims in the local courts, greatly
simplifying the process of personal jurisdiction over foreign manufactur-
ers. 60
Tort remedies are also available when third parties interfere with
the contractual relationship between dealer and principal. For instance, if
a manufacturer conspires with a prospective distributor to terminate the
present distributor's contract, and as a result, the contract with the ag-
grieved distributor is terminated, not only can the manufacturer be held
liable for tortious interference of contractual relations, but the conspiring
successor distributor can be liable for tort damages as well. 6' Court
See supra note 34.
" See Law 75, supra note 5, § 278b-2.56aX
' Because Puerto Rico is a civil law jurisdiction, the principal will need to hire local
counsel experienced in civil law litigation and in a foreign language (Spanish).
Act No. 104 of June 28, 1965.
On June 28, 1965 the Puerto Rican Legislature promulgated a companion statute, Act No.
105 of June 28, 1965. Act 105 amends Rule 4.7 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure,
simplifying the process to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the manufacturers. This
amendment clearly places the breach of contract actions within the scope of Puerto Rico's long-
arm statute, allowing service by certified mail. Puerto Rico's Dealer's Contracts, supra note 11,
at 454 n. 10. This amendment is consistent with Article 1802 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code,
which includes in its definition of tort actions "an[y] act or omission caus[ing] damage to anoth-
er through fault or negligence . . . ." P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1990).
' The reach of the amended Long Arm Statute in a Law 75 action was successfully tested
in Executive Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 254 F. Supp. 415 (D.P.R. 1966). The
court held that in a dispute over a distribution contract, a non-resident corporation with a distrib-
utor in Puerto Rico was subject to the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure, therefore amenable
to personal jurisdiction. kd at 417. The relationship in that case was one of
manufacturer/distributor. The contract specified that the manufacturer give discounts and payment
terms to the distributor and supply all of the promotional and administrative materials. Although
the distributor could appoint sub-agents, it could do so only with approval from the principal.
Given the nature of the relationship, there was no question that the manufacturer was subject to
the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedures. Colon, supra note 1, at 288.
" If conspiracy between the manufacturer and the successor distributor results in the unjust
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cases indicate that the aggrieved party must demonstrate that the con-
spiring successor distributor acted intentionally with knowledge of the
existence of a contract.' In addition, interference by a third party could
cause loss of diversity jurisdiction since the aggrieved distributor will
join the local conspirator/prospective distributor with the manufacturer,
destroying diversity.63 Loss of diversity would result in losing federal
court jurisdiction. Without federal court jurisdiction the case would be
tried in the local courts in Puerto Rico, subjecting the principal to a
foreign forum. Few cases have been decided on the issue of tortious
interference with distributors' contracts. ' Given the pro-distributor in-
terpretation of the Act by the Puerto Rico courts, however, it is likely
that in future cases, the courts will continue to hold a successor distrib-
utor jointly liable with the principal.
III. PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE ACT
Law 75 is the result of on-going successful lobbying efforts of the
Commission on Industry and Commerce and the Puerto Rico Chamber
of Commerce on behalf of local dealers, distributors, and agents.65
These lobbying efforts did not stop after the advocates of the Act ob-
tained its passage in the Legislature. Anytime an unfavorable decision
came down from the courts, the lobbying efforts resumed, attempting to
close the loopholes and make the Act more restrictive.' These efforts
termination of the previous distributor's contract, the successor distributor could be held liable for
damages and/or injunctive relief to the former distributor, under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico
Civil Code. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1990). See also Salamone, supra note 7, at 83.
Furthermore, the liability may extend to all persons participating in the conspiracy. Id.
6 General Office Prods. v. A.M. Capen's Sons, 115 P.R. Dec. 553 (1984). In Gen. Office
Prods., the court held that the third party was jointly and severally liable with the principal and
defined various elements that must be present for a finding of tortious interference with a con-
tractual obligation. Those factors are: (1) there must be a contract with which the third party in-
terferes; (2) the victim must introduce facts or prove that the third party acted intentionally with
knowledge of the existence of a contract; (3) the plaintiff must have suffered damages; and (4) a
causal relationship between damages to the victim and the actions of the third party. Id.
6 See El Gran Video Club Corp. v. E.T.D., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 151 (D.P.R. 1991) (remand
to Commonwealth court granted. Joinder of non-diverse dealer was proper where defendant dealer
had intentionally contributed to principal's refusal to honor exclusive dealership agreement).
See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Abarca Warehouses Corp., 476 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1973) (if fault
or negligence of one party causes injury to a party to a contract, the aggrieved party's right to
recovery lies in tort). Cf. Dolphin Int'l of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 91 J.T.S.
13 (1991) (in answering the certified question, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court suggested that
recognition of a tortious interference claim would require an underlying contractual obligation);
Panamerican Pharmaceutical v. Sherman Lab., 293 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D.P.R. 1986); Romero v.
ITE Imperial Corp., 332 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D.P.R. 1971)]. In beth, Panamerican and Romero
the court carefully avoided ruling on this issue. Salamone, supra note 7, at 82-83.
See supra notes 22-23 & 49.
On May 9, 1973, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court declared the retrospective application of
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were assisted by the on-going use of the local press.' This pro-distrib-
utor and anti-manufacturer environment is best exemplified in a letter
sent in 1963 by the most influential members of the Chamber of Com-
merce' to the then Governor of Puerto Rico, the Hon. Luis Mufioz
Marin.' In their letter, these members stated that, for U.S. corpora-
tions, it is a "privilege" to be able to do business in Puerto Rico, and
that they should be viewed not as bringing employment, but as displac-
ing the local entrepreneurs.7" The potentially adverse consequences to
contractual relationships, such as manufacturers establishing their own
distribution in Puerto Rico in order to avoid the pitfalls of the Act, as
well as the potentially adverse economic consequences such as increased
prices to the consumer,7' were not a priority in the minds of the spon-
sors of the Act.7 Nor were the negative effects of similar legislation
Law 75 unconstitutional. See generally, Warner Lambert Co. v. Tribunal Superior, 101 P.R. Dec.
378 (1973). Three days later, the president of the Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the
legislature requesting the amendment to the Act. Letter From Herminio Fernandez Torrecillas,
President, Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico, Letter to Lic. Alberto Ferrer (May 12, 1973)
(on file with the author). See also, Letter From Rafael Pico, President, Commission of Commerce
and Industry, et. al. Letter to the Senate of Puerto Rico (May 24, 1965) (on file with the au-
thor). In their letter the authors, members of the various commissions of the Senate of Puerto
Rico urged the Senate body to amend the Act and also the Rules of Civil Procedure, so that
violation of the Act would be considered a tort, and the distributor would have personal jurisdic-
tion over the foreign principal or manufacturer, regardless of the principal's contacts in Puerto
Rico. Id
See Ramon M. Diaz, Commercial Firms Denounce U.S. Manufacturers, EL IMPARCAL,
June 14, 1963; Ramon M. Diaz, Complaints About U.S. Manufacturers Will be Investigated, EL
ImPARCIAL, August 13, 1963; Dario Cario, Agency and Distributorship Cancellations by U.S.
Manufacturers Causes Panic in Puerto Rico, EL MUNDO, Aug. 13, 1963; Law is amended to
protect Agents and Distributors from Foreign Manufacturers, EL IMPARcIAL, Apr. 9, 1966;
Enrique Grau Esteban, Amendment to Protect Distributors when their Contract is Cancelled, EL
IMPARCLAL, June 10, 1967; Editorial, Chamber of Commerce Signals That the Puerto Rican
Economy is in Danger Because of the Termination of Distributor's Contracts by Foreign Firms,
EL MUNDO, Sep. 12, 1970. (translation from Spanish by the author).
" The letter was signed by the members of the Special Committee on Commercial Relations
represented by the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the Vice-president and six prominent
members of the business community. Letter From Bird, President of the Chamber of Commerce
of Puerto Rico, et. al., Letter to the Hon. Luis Mufioz Main, Governor of Puerto Rico, (Aug.
1963) (on file with the author).
Id.
" The letter states in pertinent part that "[t]he giant foreign corporations do not realize that
it is a privilege to operate under the corporate umbrella in Puerto Rico and, in the absence of
state regulation, do and undo, destroying the private initiative of the Puertorican people." (transla-
tion from Spanish by the author). ILd
"' Middlemen such as distributors usually increase the cost of the product to the end user.
Eliminating one layer in the distribution chain would lower distribution costs. See GALBRAITH,
supra note 2.
" See Gaetin, supra note 11, at 497-500. See also Colon, supra note 1, at 250-53. In the
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on foreign commerce evaluated.73 The proponents of the Act were only
concerned with the protection of dealers/distributors, not with the cost of
the legislation to the consumer nor the effect on the interests of manu-
facturers or the economy.74
All dealer protection legislation, however, is not as restrictive or
harmful to commerce. The Federal Automobile Dealer's Day in Court
Act 5 was enacted by the United States Congress in an effort to protect
exclusive automobile dealers from unscrupulous automobile manufactur-
ers making unjustifiable demands under the threat of cancellation of the
dealership. 7' Although the supporters of Puerto Rico's statute compare
first few years following the enactment of Law 75, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court was skeptical
about the statement of motives in Law 75's legislative history. A Different Opinion, supra note
7, at 626. In Warner Lambert,101 P.R. Dec. 378, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico stated:
Neither the statement of motives nor the legislative committee reports, adduce a single
fact in support of such statement. No public hearings were held to argue the situation
presented by Act No. 75. There was not even a debate on the floor of the legislative
bodies when the Act was enacted. We have no basis to take judicial notice of the
effect that the termination of the distribution contracts may have on the economy of
Puerto Rico or on our society.
On the contrary, in the absence of facts which justify the legislative declaration
on the need of Act No. 75, we find that the operation of the exclusive dealer in the
distribution of food products has been protested because its commission constitutes an
additional cost assumed by the consumer.
Id. at 627 (quoting from Warner Lambert). Furthermore, the Warner Lambert opinion contains a
study by John Kenneth Galbraith, a world renowned economist, who recommends the elimination
of middlemen or dealers in order to improve the distribution efficiency of food products. Id. at
627 n.8 (quoting from n.10 of the Warner Lambert opinion).
' The source for Law 75 is a statute from the Dominican Republic, a country not generally
regarded as committed to freedom of commerce. A Different Opinion, supra note 7, at 626
(1989). It has not been uncommon for the Dominican Republic to enact legislation making it
difficult for foreign firms to establish relationships within its borders. Id. at n.5. The analogous
Dominican statute is Law No. 173 of April 6, 1966, as amended by Law 263 of December 31,
1971 and Law No. 622 of December 28, 1973. Id. See also Colon, supra note 1, at 262-264.
Article 12 of Law No. 622 places serious obstacles in the path of any foreign entity wishing to
engage in distribution in the Dominican Republic. In fact, while both, Law 75 and its Dominican
Republic counterpart have similar restrictions, there is one difference. The Dominican Republic
statute, Law 173 does not apply to principals located within the Dominican Republic. It only
applies if the manufacturer is a foreign entity. Id. A similar statute exists in Cuba. See Gaetin,
supra note 11, at 500 n.15 (citing Decreto 4504 promulgado en la Gaceta Oficial el 22 de
Diciembre de 1947).
7 See excerpts of the Warner Lambert opinion, supra note 72.
Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982).
76 Many automobile dealers were being subjected to coercion and intimidation by manufac-
turers. Under the threat of cancellation of their dealerships, dealers were required to acquire un-
necessarily large showrooms, or purchase undesired parts or models of cars. These unreasonable
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Law 75 to the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act7 this compar-
ison is unfounded. In fact, Law 75 is a major departure from the -provi-
sions of the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act.
The Puerto Rico Act applies to anyone within the statutory defini-
tion of "dealer" 78 and prohibits termination without just cause or the
non-renewal of a contract upon its normal expiration.' In contrast, the
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act only addresses "exclusive" deal-
ers and does not convert terminable dealer contracts into non-terminable
ones.' The intent of the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act is to
prevent improper or coercive behavior on the part of the manufacturer
and insure that the manufacturer acts in good faith.
In comparison, good faith is irrelevant in the enforcement of the
Puerto Rico statute. Law 75 was enacted to prevent the termination of
dealers or distributors by principals, irrespective of whether the principal
acted in good faith.8 ' Furthermore, while Law 75 declares unenforce-
able many covenants unfavorable to the dealer, the Automobile Dealer's
Day in Court Act permits any action within the terms of the contract,
including termination. 2 In addition, many states within the U.S. have
also enacted legislation for the protection of distributors, dealers and
franchises against wrongful termination."3 None are as restrictive in
their interpretation of just cause as Law 75,' and none contain the ab-
requirements placed undue financial burdens on the dealers. See generally Kessler, Automobile
Dealer Franchise: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE .J. 1135 (1957).
" See Colon, supra note 1, at 260 (Suggesting that the Puerto Rico Legislature developed
Law 75 from the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court). See also Gaetin, supra note 11, at 527-
28.
n See supra note 33.
See supra notes 32, 34.
See Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, supra note 76. See also Colon, supra note 1,
at 260.
u See supra note 6.
Fornaris, 423 F.2d at 568, (citing Berry Bros. Buick, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 257
F. Supp. 542, 546 (E.D.Pa. 1966), affid mem., 377 F.2d. 552 (3d Cir. 1967)).
t WFDL, supra note 19. California Franchise Relations Act, supra note 19. In total, sixteen
states, including the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia, have enacted some type of
legislation requiring good cause for termination of contracts. Emerson, supra note 11, at 1509-13
(explaining types of legislation in this area).
" The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law is a good example of such legislation. In 1974, Wis-
consin enacted legislation to protect gas station operators, chain-restaurant owners, and small
business operators from unjust termination or other unfair actions by the principal. Dittmar, supra
note 12, at 155. In Foerster, Inc. v. Atlas Metal Parts, 105 Wis. 2d 19, 313 N.W.2d 61 (1981),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an agreement between a manufacturer and his represen-
tative did not constitute a dealership under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law. Id. at 157. The
court reasoned that a narrow interpretation should be given to the definition of dealership. Id.
But cf. supra note 33. Puerto Rico Law 75's all encompassing definition of dealership. In con-
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solute restrictions that Law 75 places on choice of law and forum.'
A. Scope of the Dealers' Contracts Act
Although, the terms dealer0 , distributor", franchisee, 8  and
agent! describe different relationships and responsibilities, Law 75 may
extend its mantle of protection to all of them, provided that their activi-
ties fall within those contemplated in the Act.' The threshold question
of whether certain activities and responsibilities fall within the Act's
definition of "dealer" has been extensively litigated."' The Puerto Rico
trast to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of dealership, the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court defines "dealer" as anyone rendering services to a principal or anyone taking the necessary
steps to gain new consumers or create a market. See Cordova & Simonpietri, 112 P.R. Dec. at
797. See also San Juan Merc., 108 P.R. Dec. 211. In contrast, "good cause" is defined by the
WFDL as:
(a) Failure by a dealer to comply substantially with essential and reasonable require-
ments imposed upon him by the grantor, or sought to be imposed by the grantor,
which requirements are not discriminatory as compared with requirements imposed on
other similarly situated dealers either by their terms or in the manner of their enforce-
ment; or
(b) Bad faith by the dealer in carrying out the terms of the dealership.
WFDL, supra note 19, § 135.02(4). In contrast, under Law 75, very few acts by the dealer give
rise to just cause for termination. See supra notes 34 & 42.
" See Law 75, supra note 5, § 278b-2. The Act states that any covenant requiring a
dealer/distributor to litigate outside Puerto Rico is null and void because it violates public policy.
Id. In contrast similar laws enacted by various states within the United States enforce choice of
law and forum selection clauses. See Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976). In upholding a forum selection clause requir-
ing action to be brought in Philadelphia, the California Supreme Court stated that California
courts enforce contractual choice of law provisions. Id. at 494. See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Gib-
bons, 684 F.2d 565, 567-8 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply California substantive law in re-
strictive covenants because the agreement contained a Minnesota choice of law clause); 33 Fla-
vors of Greater Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 217, 226-228
(D. Del. 1979) (holding that a Delaware franchisee was subject to the Illinois choice of law
provision in the distributor's contract).
See BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY, supra note 22, at 399.
Id. at 475.
u Id at 659.
Id at 63.
The Act defines a "dealer" as one who is "actually interested in a dealer's contract be-
cause of his having effectively in his charge in Puerto Rico the distribution, agency, concession
or representation of a given merchandise or service." Law 75, supra note 5 § 278(a).
91 See Cordova, 112 P.R. Dec. at 803 (promoting and selling insurance contracts, constitutes
a franchise relationship under Law 75); San Juan Merc., 108 P.R. Dec. at 211 (exclusivity not a
requirement to be considered a dealer); J. Soler Motors, 108 D.P.R. 134 (non-exclusivity or re-
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Supreme Court, in an attempt to provide some guidance to the lower
courts, outlined factors that must be considered to determine if the rela-
tionship is protected under the Act.' The court decisions define a deal-
er as an independent entrepreneur engaged in an on-going relationship
with a principal/grantor for the distribution of products and services-
designed to develop or expand a market for the products of the
principal/grantor.9 3 This entrepreneur. must be able to show that .he ac-
tively promotes the products, has authority to conclude contracts, pur-
chases and keeps his own inventory, has discretion in fixing prices and
sales terms, has invoicing and delivery responsibilities for the products
or services, and has the facilities to offer product-related services to cli-
ents.94
These same decisions also indicate, however, that a salesperson or
commissioned representative would not be considered a dealer for the
purposes of the Act.'s The courts reason that a salesperson or commis-
sioned representative is not an independent business entrepreneur,' does
served rights by the principal to sell directly does not remove the relationship from the Act's
protection). But see Sudouest Import Sales Corp., 732 F.2d at 15 (finding that representative was
not a dealer because it did not handle product billings and receipts and had limited involvement
in sales and promotions); Mario R. Franceschini, Inc. v. Riley Co., 591 F. Supp. 414 (D.P.R.
1984) (not a dealer because it did not buy the equipment nor had the authority to fix sales
terms or perform billing). But see Computec Systems Corp., 599 F. Supp. at 823, n.7 (being in
charge of the dealership is a key requirement).
n At the end of its 1988 term, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court discussed the circumstances
under which a grantee would be considered a.dealer. Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 264. In
Roberto Colon, Inc. v. Oxford Industries, Inc, 88 J.T.S. 102 (1988), the court stated:
To determine whether one is before a "dealer," various factors must be taken into
account, among them: whether the dealer conducts an active promotion and/or closing
of contracts; whether it acquires inventory; whether it exercises control over prices;
whether it has discretion in reaching agreement over the terms of the sales; whether it
is responsible for the delivery and collection of merchandise and authority to grant
credit . . . . To these, others may be added, lest it be understood or intended that this
be a complete listing.
Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 265.
" Roberto Colon, Inc. In Colon, the court defined various factors, that while not individually
dispositive, when considered as a whole classify the grantee as a dealer entitled to protection
under the Act. Some of the factors defined by the court were: (1) being an independent business
person with an ongoing relationship with the principal; (2) active promotion and marketing of the
product; (3) keeping one's own inventory; (4) discretion to establish sales prices; (5) responsibili-
ty for extending credit, billing and product delivery; and (6) the assumption of business risks
associated with the activities undertaken. Id.
See William B. Topp v. Narrow Fabrics of America, No. 87-0703 GG, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1390, at *6-*8 (D.P.R. Feb. 2, 1989) (soliciting orders for new business, maintenance of
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not assume the normal business risks associated with business opera-
tions,' and does not have the discretion to establish sales prices nor to
make decisions on extension of credit or product deliveries." In con-
trast, under certain circumstances, an agent for the principal can be con-
sidered a dealer if his contractual relationship with the principal shows
that the agent has the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities normally
associated with owning and operating a business." Hence, it is not the
label placed on the relationship that controls whether it is protected
under the Act, but the responsibilities and acts that the agent per-
forms.'
B. The Narrow Interpretation of "Just Cause"
The Act defines "just cause" in terms of acts committed by the
dealer that adversely and substantially affect the interests of the princi-
pal,"' but does not address the effects of changes in the market-
place,'" total non-discriminatory withdrawal from the market," or
existing accounts and performing limited advertising are not necessarily dealer activities, but may
also be activities of a- commissioned salesperson not protected by the Act).
See E.B.I., Inc. v. Gator Industries, Inc., 807 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (commissioned sales
people are not protected by Law 75 because they do not take substantial business risks nor are
they authorized to close sales).
See Morales v. Gregg Shirt Makers, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 142, 144-145 (D.P.R. 1988) (ex-
clusive sales representative who sold $880,000.00 in merchandise over a period of eight years is
not a dealer as defined by the Act when he does not maintain inventory nor take any credit risk
since the credit checks and collections were made by the principal).
See Lineas Aereas Costarricences, S.A. (LASCA) v. Caribbean, 682 F. Supp. 117 (D.P.R.
1988). In Lineas Aereas Costarricences, S.A., the court found that Caribbean's relationship with
LACSA was covered under Law 75. The contract between LASCA and Caribbean stated that
Caribbean was solely responsible for employing personnel at its own expense, purchasing the
necessary licenses, all business losses or credit risks, and conducting all marketing and sales
campaigns at its own expense. Id. The court reasoned that Caribbean's duties and responsibilities
as well as the great business risk assumed by the contract, placed Caribbean within the intended
meaning of Law 75. Id.
See Roberto Colon, Inc., 88 J.T.S. 102.
101 Law 75, supra note 5, § 278(d). For the definition of just cause see supra note 34.
' The courts have stated that just cause does not include good faith termination of the con-
tract by the principal nor the right of the manufacturer to adjust its distribution system to ex-
pand the market. Salamone, supra note 7, at 105 (citing Warner Lambert Co., 101 P.R. Dec. at
400). Furthermore, the need to implement changes in the principal's worldwide operations does
not constitute just cause. ld. at n.131.
"' Just cause does not include termination of the distributor as a result of the principal's
bona-fide or partial withdrawal from the market due to unprofitability. Id. at 70 n.10. But see
Medina & Medina, 858 F.2d 817 (Law 75 does not bar principal from good faith total
withdrawal from the market). The tough limitations and conditions precedent outlined by the
court for a total withdrawal defense to prevail make it highly unlikely that it will be used often.
Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 280.
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other causes affecting the grantor, such as raising a defense of impossi-
bility of performance."° Accordingly, under a literal reading, just cause
does not include dealer termination due to bona-fide market reasons.
These gaps in the statutory definition have" left the interpretation of what
constitutes just cause to the courts," which have interpreted the Act
as giving broad protection to the dealer." The decisions show that the
courts' interpretation of "just cause" is very restrictive."°
A principal/grantor may terminate a dealer with just cause only as
a result of two types of conduct. The first encompasses cases where the
dealer/distributor breaches any essential contractual obligation, or where
an act or omission by the dealer/distributor substantially and materially
affects the interests of the principal or grantor with regards to its mar-
keting efforts in Puerto Rico."° An essential obligation would be one
negotiated and agreed upon by the parties and included in the contract.
Breach by the dealer or distributor of any covenant containing such
agreed upon obligations is likely to fall under the statutory definition of
just cause," giving the principal a valid defense against an action for
termination initiated by a dealer/distributor.
Law 75 also seems to preclude the principal from raising the defenses of impossibility of
performance or rebus sic stantibus. Id.
" See supra note 37. Although there has been considerable litigation on the question of just
cause, there is very little consistency in the construction of the term. Rodriguez Vidal, supra
note 7, at 269. Courts have had to apply their own interpretation of the term. Id.
" The interpretation given to just cause by the courts supports the view that the mantle of
protection afforded to the dealerldistributor is broad and inclusive. Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7,
at 297.
"' See General Office Products Corp. v. Gussco Mfg., Inc., 666 328, 331, (D.P.R. 1987)
(inactivity by a manufacturer, after being notified of third party interferences with the
distributor's exclusive contract constitute termination without just cause). Tamachi, Inc., 651 F.
Supp. at 1360, n.1 (principal cannot undermine contractual relationship with distributor nor refuse
to renew the contract without just cause); See also Biomedical Instrument & Equip. v. Cordis
Corp., 797 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986) (reversing a summary judgment granted for the manufacturer
on the issue of termination with just cause for lack of payments); Jordan K. Rand, Ltd. v.
Lazoff Bros., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 587 (D.P.R. 1982) (non payment of royalties and unauthorized
use of trademark constitute just cause for termination).
" Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 266. See also Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. at
587; An-Port, Inc. v. M.B.R. Indus., 772 F. Supp. 1301 (P.R. Dec. 1991). In An-Port the court
stated that distribution of competing products by a dealer in violation of a contract clause, ad-
versely and substantially affected the interests of the principal in marketing its products.
Therefore, the principal had just cause for termination. I
"O A dealer that assigned maintenance duties to a third party was in violation of his distribu-
tion agreement because the maintenance duty was an "essential obligation" under the contract.
Accordingly the principal had just cause for termination. Pan American Computer Corp., 562 F.
Supp. 693. See also Luis Rosario, Inc., 733 F.2d 172. In Luis Rosario, Inc., a dealer violated
an essential obligation of the contract by not keeping adequate inventory and operating his own
service organization. Therefore, the principal had just cause for termination. Id
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The second type of conduct is that which involves a
dealer/distributor committing a business tort such as trademark infringe-
ments, non-payment of royalties or for merchandise, or unfair competi-
tion.' This behavior constitutes dealer misconduct which adversely
affects the principal. Hence, termination of a dealer with just cause
would occur only in instances of substantial breach or dealer misconduct
that substantially and adversely affects the principal's or grantor's mar-
keting efforts.
1. Interpretation of "Just Cause"
In most non-renewal or contract termination cases the principal or
grantor claims either dishonest practices, material breaches, or poor per-
formance on the part of the dealer as the reason for termination.' An
analysis of litigated cases under the Act indicates that Law 75 focuses
only on substantial breaches that adversely and substantially affect the
principal or grantor. Court decisions make a broad distinction between
substantial and minor breaches."2 The following actions by a deal-
er/distributor have been found to be substantial breaches giving rise to
termination with just cause: (1) unfair competition by the unauthorized
use of a trademark;" (2) dealer assigning his contractual rights to a
competitor of the principal without authorization;"' (3) dealer failing to
maintain adequate inventory and failing to operate his own service orga-
nization;"s (4) consistent violation of payment terms;"6 and (5) fail-
11 See De Moss 493 F.2d 1012 (granting principal's request to enjoin agent from continuing
another business relationship in violation of the agreement); John K. Rand, Ltd., 537 F. Supp.
587 (failure by distributor to pay royalties and unauthorized use of a trademark are reasons for
termination with just cause). For additional discussion on the concept's interpretation by the
courts, see also Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 269.
.. See P.P.M. Chemical Corp. v. Saskatoon Chemicals, Ltd., 931 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1991)
(dealer's continual violation of payment terms constitutes a material breach of the contract); Bio-
medical Instrument & Equip. v. Cordis Corp., 797 F.2d 16 (D.P.R. 1986) (dealer's failure to pay
on time the amounts due constitutes a violation of one of the essential obligations of the con-
tract); Luis Rosario, Inc., 733 F.2d 172 (failure to keep adequate inventory and operate own
service organization in addition to poor sales is a material breach of the contract); Pan American
Computer Corp., 652 F.2d 215 (dealer assignment of his contractual rights to a competitor of the
principal violated the dealer's essential obligations under the contract) De Moss, 493 F.2d 1012
(distributor's violation of covenant on ownership of competing business constitutes unfair compe-
tition); Jordan K Rand, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 587 (dealer's use of trademark for unfair competition
was a substantial breach of the contract).
" See La Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d 1. In La Playa Santa Marina, the court deemed
dealer's declining sales and performance problems as minor breaches and not enough to consti-
tute just cause. Id. at 3.
1 Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 587.
11 Pan American Computer Corp., 652 F.2d. 215.
11 Luis Rosario, Inc., 733 F.2d 172.
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ure to pay royalties when due."7 In contrast, declining sales and per-
formance problems have been deemed minor breaches and not just cause
for termination."' Because allegations of poor performance are usually
related to performance objectives agreed upon by the parties, principals
should be aware that dealers/distributors are not bound by contract pro-
visions establishing standards of conduct, sales and performance quotas,
or distribution objectives."9 Therefore, in an action contesting the ter-
mination of the contract, the principal can expect that the distributor is
likely to allege that those standards, quotas, etc. do not conform to the
realities of the market in Puerto Rico, and therefore he cannot be held
responsible for non-compliance.'
2. Duration of the Agreement
The Act protects the dealer/distributor from contract covenants re-
stricting the length of the relationship.'' Furthermore, the Act estab-
lishes that a manufacturer cannot refuse to renew a distribution contract
if the dealer/distributor desires to continue the relationship." Neverthe-
less, in recent cases the courts have stated that the freedom of contract
is limited by Puerto Rico law only in those circumstances that violate
", P.P.M. Chemical Corp., 931 F.2d 938.
"' Biomedical Instrument & Equip., 797 F.2d 16.
"' See La Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d 1.
On July 13, 1988, the Puerto Rico Legislature approved an amendment to Law 75. See
supra note 5. This amendment added § 278a-1 which states in pertinent parts:
(c) it will not be deemed to be just cause any violation or non-performance, by the
distributor, of any covenant included in the distribution contract that establishes canons
of conduct, quotes or performance objectives that do not reflect the market realities in
Puerto Rico at the time of the violation or non-performance by the distributor. The
burden of proof to demonstrate the reasonability of the canon of conduct, quota or
objective lies with the principal or grantor.
Law 75, surpa note 5, § 278a-1 (translated from Spanish by the author).
'2 Id
222 The Act provides:
Notwithstanding the existence in a dealer's contract of a clause reserving to the parties
the unilateral right to terminate the existing relationship, no principal or grantor may
directly or indirectly perform any act detrimental to the established relationship or
refuse to renew said contract on its normal expiration, except for just cause.
Law 75, supra note 5, § 278a.
222 Id
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public policy." These rulings do not grant the principal a blanket
right to terminate the contract. In fact, the courts have upheld termina-
tion or non-renewal of a dealership agreement in those cases where the
market conditions were such that the principal wanted to completely
withdraw from the market.'" The principal/grantor must be aware that
while total withdrawal from the Puerto Rican marketplace may constitute
just cause,"z withdrawal from the market in order to either sell or ser-
vice directly or through other sources will most likely not be considered
just cause for termination."6 It is important that this option and reser-
vation of rights by the principal be covered in the agreement by the in-
clusion of a covenant. The covenant should state that the principal and
the dealer/distributor agree that the contract may be terminated in the
event that the distributor totally withdraws from the marketplace.
3. Notice Requirements
Notice of termination or non-renewal is not only legally neces-
sary,"7 but is also necessary for fairness to the parties. Termination or
non-renewal notice gives dealers and distributors the opportunity to miti-
gate the financial impact that the discontinuance of the relationship will
have by planning for alternate sources of income or adjusting invento-
ries.
" Contracts must be performed "pursuant to the codified doctrine of pacta sunt servanta
(agreements must be respected). P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 31, § 2994. Cassera Foods, Inc. v. E.L.A.,
108 P.R. Dec. 850 (1979) (emphasis added). See also Grisson v. Colotti, 644 F. Supp. 903, 905
(D.P.R. 1986) (stating that the freedom of contract is limited by Puerto Rico Law only in those
circumstances that violate public policy, morals or the law).
" Law 75 does not bar the principal from withdrawing from the market provided that his
action is not aimed at capitalizing on the good will or customer base created by the dealer.
Medina & Medina, 858 F.2d at 824. (citing the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico). Cf. Warner
Lambert Co., 101 P.R. Dec. at 400 (need to implement worldwide marketing changes does not
justify termination of the dealer/distributor).
1"5 In Medina & Medina, 858 F.2d at 824, the court stated that the Act applied where the
principal terminates the dealer/distributor with the purpose of either selling directly or appointing
other dealers/distributors. Id. The Act did not apply in the cases of good faith total withdrawal
from the market. Id.
' See id.
'" Reasonable notice must be given to afford the dealer an opportunity to explore alternative
sources of income. See generally id. Courts will examine all the conditions surrounding the con-
tract termination and renewal negotiations, including duration and extent of negotiations, in deter-
mining the reasonableness of the notice term. Id. at 823.
" Ud. See also, Faruki, supra note 11, at 931. In discussing the requirement for notice of
termination, Faruki states that notice of termination is fair because it gives the distributor the op-
portunity to adjust his inventory, seek alternate suppliers, and adjust his business plan. Id. Fur-
thermore, the notice of termination will trigger a duty on the part of the distributor to mitigate
damages. IdL
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C. Uneforceable Contractual Clauses Under the Dealers' Contracts
Act
Standard distribution contracts commonly used in the U.S. between
manufacturers and dealers/distributors have been labeled adhesion con-
tracts in Puerto Rico," and hence, many of the clauses contained in
them have been held to be unenforceable.
1. Customary or Boiler-Plate Distribution Agreements
Because the manufacturer usually develops the contract and the
general covenants, they have been considered by Spanish scholars as
giving unequal bargaining power to the manufacturer.". This argument
was used by the proponents of Law 75 to justify legislative protection
for Puerto Rican dealers and distributors against the use of boiler-plate
language.' 3' The supporters of the Act justify the restrictions placed by
Law 75 on the" freedom of contract, as a way to restore equal bargain-
ing power between the manufacturers and the dealer/distributors.'32
Many of the standard clauses found in most distribution contracts
such as the principal's right to terminate or not renew the contract33
and the right to establish performance covenants'"4 are invalid or unen-
forceable under the Act.'" In contrast, in other U.S. jurisdictions with
comparable legislation, the parties are free to include in a contract any
" In an adhesion contract the contractual covenants are usually established and imposed by
the more powerful economic entity. Colon, supra note 1, at 228. The parties are in total disequi-
librium. Accordingly, the principles of contractual autonomy are broken. Id. (translation from
Spanish by the author).
SI LutS RIERA AISA, Contrato in 5 NUEVA ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA, 317, 321 as cited in
Colon, supra note 1, at 228. This type of contract should not be allowed in Puerto Rico. It
should be restricted to certain type of activities only, such as insurance and ban loan agreements.
Id.
3 It is necessary for the legislature to provide protection to the dealers and distributors be-
cause they are in an inferior bargaining position. Colon, supra note 1, at 229. Distributors have
to accept whatever is established by the principal, who is always in position to dictate the con-
tract terms. Id. Most contracts drafted by the principal include the right to terminate by either
party. But it is usually the principal, who in bad faith, terminates the dealer. Hence, these dis-
tributors need the protection of the legislation. Id. at 232.
It at 229.
's Except under narrowly defined circumstances the principal cannot unilaterally terminate the
contract. See supra notes 34, 103-104, 110-113.
" The Act states that violation by the dealer of performance objectives, quotas or any other
covenant restricting the dealer's course of conduct, will not be grounds for termination with just
cause. The principal has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the performance objectives were
reasonable for the market conditions at the time of breach. Law 75, supra note 5, § 278a-lc.
' See supra note 51.
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agreed upon covenants, including performance quotas and termination
clauses. Furthermore, the courts will enforce agreed upon covenants as
representative of the intent of the parties."
Because Law 75 was enacted to protect the dealer,'37 prior to en-
tering into negotiations for a distribution or dealership contract in Puerto
Rico, the principal must clearly understand: (1) what constitutes a pro-
tected "dealer" under Law 75; and (2) what restrictions the Act imposes
on the enforcement of certain distribution contracts' covenants.
2. Changes in Ownership, Management and Financing
The distributor is not forced to comply with contractual clauses
restricting changes in ownership, management or business structure of
his operation.3 These contract clauses, commonly found in franchise
agreements, are not enforceable under Law 75 unless it is proven by the
principal that the violation of any such clause has adversely and sub-
stantially affected the interests of the principal in the development of the
market place.'39
3. Changes in the Course of Dealing
The Act establishes a presumption of termination without just cause
whenever the distributor appoints additional dealers/distributors, or unjus-
tifiably withholds or delays merchandise deliveries, or changes, prejudic-
ing the distributor, shipping methods or payment terms and condi-
13 See Automobile Dealer's Day in Court, supra note 19 (any action within the terms of the
contract is permissible including termination); WFDL, supra note 19 (choice of law will be re-
spected). See also Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66
YALE L. 1135 (1956) (comparison of the statutes enacted by various states protecting the
distributor's contract rights).
13 1966 P.R. LAws 332, supra note 6, Statement of Motives of the Act.
§ 278a-1 states in pertinent parts:
(a) It will not be considered just cause any violation, by the distributor, of any cov-
enant included in the distribution contract that impairs or restricts changes in the capi-
tal structure of the distributor, or management changes, or means of financing the
operation, or is designed to impair or restrict the sale, transfer, or encumbrance of any
corporate action, participative share, rights or interests owned by any person in said
distribution business, unless the principal or grantor demonstrates that the violation
may affect or has already affected adversely and substantially the interests of the prin-
cipal or grantor in the development of the market, distribution or delivery of ser-
vices.
Law 75, supra note 5, § 278a-1.
13 d.
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tions." Nevertheless, in limited circumstances courts have allowed
changes in the course of dealing, provided that they did not have a
detrimental effect on the operation of the dealer/distributor.14 ' In evalu-
ating whether a change in the course of dealing constitutes termination
without just cause, the court will also inquire as to whether the change
was contemplated in the original agreement, reflecting the original inten-
tion of the parties." It is clear that subsequent intentions, once the
relationship has gone sour, are not likely to prevail in an unjust termi-
nation action under Law 75143
D. Non Waivable Dealers' Rights
The rights and remedies of Law 75 are conferred as a matter of
public policy and cannot be waived.)" The courts, in enforcing this
clause, have often invalidated contractual provisions, implied or explicit,
between distributors and manufacturers." The covenants most fre-
quently invalidated are the choice of law or forum selection
clauses,'"and renewal/non-renewal clauses.47  Additionally, in many
See supra note 51.
"' The principal has the right to establish a distributor and require the dealer to do business
through such distributor, provided that at the inception of the contract between the principal and
the dealer, the principal had reserved the right to appoint distributors. J. Soler Motors, 108 P.R.
Dec. at 135. Requiring the dealer to conduct his business through a newly appointed distributor
did not constitute "undermining of the relationship" because there was no detrimental effect on
the dealer operations and was contemplated in the original contract. Id. at 144.142 Id.,
"0 La Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d 1; J. Soler Motors, 108 P.R. Dec. 134.
'" The Act states:
The provisions of this chapter are of a public order and therefore the rights deter-
mined by such provisions cannot be waived. This chapter being of a remedial charac-
ter, should, for the most effective protection of such rights, be liberally interpreted; in
the adjudgment of the claims that may arise hereunder, the courts of justice shall
recognize the right in favor of whom may, effectively, have at his charge the distribu-
tion of activities, notwithstanding the corporate or contractual structures or mechanisms
that the principal or grantor may have created or imposed to conceal the real nature
of the relationship established.
Law 75, supra note 5, § 278c.
" See Pan American Computer Corp. 467 F. Supp. at 970 (any covenant implying the in-
tention by the parties to place a distribution contract outside the reach of the statute is null and
void); Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 P.R. Dec. 184, 189 (1975) (the rights of the
distributor to select Puerto Rico as the forum cannot be waived).
, The decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico are the Law in Puerto Rico, and
binding on both Commonwealth and the federal district court of Puerto Rico. King Seely Ther-
mos Co. v. Emesto F. Rodriguez, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 894 (D.P.R. 1974). See also Gemco
Latinoamerica, Inc., 623 F. Supp. at 918 (Commonwealth law applies notwithstanding a covenant
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instances, the courts have precluded the principal from enforcing certain
contract covenants, such as the reservation of rights to change
distributor's credit terms or course of dealing because they may be det-
rimental to the legitimate expectations of the dealer."4 The Act will
also preclude the principal from enforcing sales quotas and performance
objectives necessary for viable operation, even if agreed upon by the
dealer at inception of the agreement.'49 In fact, courts have ruled that
termination of a dealer/distributor by the principal, for failure to meet
performance objectives is considered unjust termination and makes the
principal liable for damages under Law 75." This is not to imply that
a manufacturer has no right to set performance quotas. In fact, most
distributor contracts contain some type of performance covenant since
the effective marketing of his products is at stake. The court's decisions
in this area seem simply to imply that sales quotas cannot be enforced
without first demonstrating that they are reasonable, at the time of en-
forcement, in light of prevailing market conditions, the state of the
economy, and competition."'
stating that contract should be interpreted pursuant to the laws of New York); Pan American
Computer Corp., 467 F. Supp. 969 (the non-waiver provision of the Act forecloses any doubt
about the invalidity of any consensual choice of jurisdiction); Southern Int'l Sales v. Potter &
Brum ield Div., 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (applying Indiana law would frustrate the
fundamental policy expressed by the Act, notwithstanding the fact that Indiana law was chosen
by both parties).
" A provision in a distribution contract stating that the contract could only be extended by
a formal writing signed by the parties and that a continuation of the business dealings could not
be interpreted as the intent of the parties to renew the contract is void because it violates the
Act. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc., 623 F. Supp. at 918.
" In Whirlpool Corp. v. U.M.C.O. Int'l Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D.Fla. 1990), the court
ruled that a contract covenant allowing the principal to alter the credit terms unilaterally was not
free from scrutiny under the Act. The court reasoned that the Act was not limited to protecting
the established relationship, but rather to protect the legitimate expectations of the
dealer/distributor. Id.
t4 See §278a-l(c), supra note 119.
's See La Playa Santa Marina, Inc., 597 F.2d at 4. In La Playa Santa Marina, the court
held that the manufacturer did not have just cause for terminating its dealer in Puerto Rico.
Here, the defendant, Chris-Craft, terminated its Puerto Rican dealership contract because of dissat-
isfaction with the dealer's performance and declining sales. The court did not find enough evi-
dence for the allegations and deemed the breaches as minor, hence, outside the court's interpreta-
tion of just cause. Id. Cf Francisco Garraton, Inc. v. Lan Man & Kemp-Barclay, 559 F. Supp.
405 (D.P.R. 1983). In Garraton, the distributorship contract was terminated by the manufacturer
for failure to properly service the manufacturer's product line. The court reasoned that the
distributor's failure to perform was not due to the principal's actions but was due to the
distributor's own financial problems. Distributor's request for injunctive relief was denied, imply-
ing that the principal had just cause for termination. Id.
"' See Salamone, supra note 7, at 106-107.
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E. Choice of Laws and Forum Selection Clauses
While the courts of most states respect choice of law and forum
selection contract clauses, 2 Law 75 clearly regards these clauses in
contracts with Puerto Rican dealers and distributors as unenforceable.
153
In fact, in diversity cases litigated in federal court, choice of forum
clauses that select forums outside Puerto Rico are always challenged,
and the courts insist that Puerto Rico law be applied."5 Law 75 invali-
dates as against public policy, any contractual provisions or stipulations
See Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc., 17 Cal. 3d at 493. In upholding a forum selection
clause requiring action to be brought in Philadelphia, the California Supreme Court stated that
California courts enforced contractual choice of law provisions. Id. see also Medtronic, Inc. v.
Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 567-68 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply California substantive law in
restrictive covenants because the agreement contained a Minnesota choice of law clause). 33
Flavors of Greater Delaware Valley, Inc., 475 F. Supp. at 226-228 (holding that a Delaware
franchisee was subject to the Illinois choice of law provision in the distributor's contract). But
see Southern Int'l Sales, 410 F. Supp. 1339 (1976). In Southern Int'L Sales, the Puerto Rican
distributor brought his action in a New York court. The principal tried to enforce' a choice of
law clause designating that the contract would be governed by Indiana law. In holding that Puer-
to Rico law applied, the Court stated:
mhe significance of th& parties choice of Indiana law would pale when viewed
against the fact that almost all of the equipment sold by Southern on defendant's
behalf was sold in Puerto Rico, for Puerto Rican accounts and for its use in Puerto
Rico; the solicitation of customers occurred in Puerto Rico; and plaintiff signed the
contract there. More to the point, the application of Indiana law would frustrate the
fundamental policy expressed in the Puerto Rican Dealer's Contract Act.
Id. at 1341.
m See Law 75, supra note 5, § 278b-2. The Act states:
The dealer's contracts referred to in this chapter shall be interpreted pursuant to
and ruled by the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other stipulation
to the contrary shall be void.
Any stipulation -that obligates a dealer to adjust, arbitrate or litigate any contro-
versy that comes up regarding his dealer's contract outside of Puerto Rico, or under
foreign law or rule of law, shall be likewise considered as violating the public policy
set forth by this chapter and is therefore null and void.
Law 75, supra note 1, § 278b-2 as amended by Act. No. 75 of June 23, 1978.
"' See Pan American Computer Corp., 467 F. Supp. 969. The United States District Court,
citing the 1978 amendment to Law 75 and stressing the strong public policy behind Law 75,
held that a contract clause designating Massachusetts law as controlling was unenforceable. Id.
See also Gemco Latinoamerica, 623 F. Supp. at 918, n.2. (setting aside a New York choice of
law covenant and applied Puerto Rico law where the contract had been partially negotiated and
executed in Puerto Rico). Compare with Southern Int'l Sales, 410 F. Supp. 1339 (Puerto Rico
law applies because applying Indiana law would frustrate the fundamental purpose of Law 75).
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that require the dealer/distributor to litigate a Law 75 dispute outside
Puerto Rico. 5 The provision was incorporated in an amendment enact-
ed in 1978."s Proponents of the amendment' "  argued that public
policy required that distribution contracts be interpreted under Puerto
Rico's laws. Their main concern was that dealers/distributors forced to
litigate in foreign forums and under foreign law would frequently be at
a disadvantage.' Nevertheless, recent court cases show that where fo-
rum-non-conveniens becomes a relevant issue, the courts may uphold
choice of forum and choice of law clauses."
In spite of the restrictions on choice of law and forum, litigants
desiring to enforce these clauses may succeed through arbitration claus-
es. While the courts in Law 75 actions have, as a matter of public poli-
cy, refused to enforce choice of law and choice of forum covenants,"
arbitration clauses are routinely enforced. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court
t, See supra note 153.
1978 P.R. LAW 341; Act No. 75 of June 23, 1978, 1978 SERVIcIo LEGisLATIVO DE PUER-
To RICO, No. 3, at 444.
5 This provision of the law is the result of the lobbying efforts by the Commission on In-
dustry, Commerce and Industrial Development on behalf of Puerto Rican dealers and distributors.
In a letter to the Senate of Puerto Rico dated May 16, 1978, Danny Lopez Soto, President of
the Commission on Industry, Commerce and Industrial Developments, recommends the adoption
of this amendment. See 1978 SERVtICo LEGISLvTVO DE PuERTo Rico, No. 3, at 444.
In a report rendered to the Senate of Puerto Rico, Danny Lopez Soto, states:
[Tihis project attends to the situation of great disadvantage in which a distributor is
frequently placed because of the inclusion in distribution contracts of certain covenants
forcing him to resolve his controversies or claim his rights in foreign forums and
under foreign laws. The P. of the C. 175 declares these covenants null and void in-
corporating the doctrine established by our Supreme Court in Walborg Corporation v.
Tribunal Superior decided on the 30 of September of 1975 (104 D.P.R. 184).
Although this case held that by express disposition of Article 4, the rights con-
ferred by Law 75 to distributors cannot be waived and that the covenants forcing a
distributor to resolve its controversies outside Puerto Rico are unenforceable, this pro-
ject to incorporate in the text of Law 75 the referred jurisprudence doctrine must be
approved.
Id
I" Although a forum selection clause will not be a dispositive factor, the convenience of the
forum, given the parties expressed preference for that venue, must be considered in the balancing
test. Royal Bed & Spring Co., v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis, Ltd., 906 F.2d 45,
52 (1st Cir. 1990). In ruling that Brazil was the most convenient forum, the court considered, in-
ter alia, the following factors: (1) both parties selected Brazil as their choice of law and forum;
(2) the furniture was manufactured in Brazil; (3) the distributor had previously litigated in Brazil;
(4) the contract was drafted in Portuguese, was signed in Brazil Id. at 52-53.
"6, See Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 912; Pan Am. Computer Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 969; Southern Int'l Sales 410 F. Supp. 1339
"' The U.S. Supreme Court held in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
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has held that the Federal Arbitration Act'" cannot be preempted by
Puerto Rico laws."° By holding that an arbitration covenant containing
a choice of forum is enforceable in a Law 75 action, the U.S. Supreme
Court has given manufacturers and grantors in diversity cases the oppor-
tunity to enforce their arbitration clauses and the choice of forum claus-
es for arbitration."z
Arbitration may be commenced by either party provided that there
is a contract provision to arbitrate." In addition, the conduct of the
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), that arbitration agreements were enforceable "as a matter of
federal law." Id at 626.
' 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et. seq. (1970). Federal policy, deriving from the Federal Arbitration Act,
favor arbitration. Faruld, supra note 11, at 940. The United States Supreme Court has given arbi-
tration agreements a liberal interpretation, consistent with the federal policy of discouraging court
litigation over arbitrability of issues when there is an agreement to arbitrate. Id.
" Law 75 provides that any covenant requiring a dealer to arbitrate a controversy under for-
eign law or in a foreign forum is invalid as violating public policy. See supra note 153. The
Puerto Rico Supreme Court has upheld this section of the act. See Walborg Corp., 104 P.R.
Dec. 184. In light of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the vitality of Walborg and
this provision of the Act is questionable. Salamone, supra note 7, at 96. Many of the Law 75
actions filed by distributors in Puerto Rico courts could be removed to federal court by reason
of diversity, since in most cases they involve U.S. or foreign companies. Id. In a landmark case,
the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of arbitration agreements and their enforceability
"as a matter of federal law." Mitsubishi Motors Corp, 417 U.S. 614. In Mitsubishi, the Court
held that "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes require [enforcement of] the parties' agreement, even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context." Id. at 617. See also Sea-Land Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Sea-Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 750 (D.P.R. 1986) (plaintiff must sub-
mit his Law 75 claim to a Miami arbitration panel); Propane Gas Co. of P.R., Inc. v. Sony
Consumer Products Co., 613 F. Supp. 215 (D.P.R. 1985) (plaintiff ordered to arbitrate in New
York). In a recent case, the U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico held that the United States Arbi-
tration Act and Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9
U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et. seq. 3, 21 U.S.T. § 2517 (1970), T.I.A.S. No. 6997, reprinted following 9
U.S.C. § 201 (1981), governed the distribution agreement containing an arbitration covenant. In
fact, in a recent case the court held as valid a covenant to arbitrate in accordance with the laws
of Ontario, Canada, and ordered arbitration before the London Court of Arbitration. McCain
Foods, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Supplies, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D.P.R. 1991).
26 In Propane Gas Co., 613 F. Supp. 215, the court held that the arbitration clause in the
agreement requiring arbitration of controversies in New York was enforceable. The court reasoned
that the Puerto Rico statute voiding any covenants providing for arbitration outside Puerto Rico
or under foreign laws violated the Supremacy clause and the Federal Arbitration Act and was
therefore unenforceable. Id. See also McCain Foods Ltd., 766 F. Supp. at 60 (forum selection
clauses in arbitration agreements must be strictly enforced, unless it is shown that enforcement
would be unreasonable or that there are compelling reasons against its enforcement); Michael v.
N.A.P. Consumer Electronics Corp., 574 F. Supp. 68 (D.P.R. 1984) (plaintiff ordered to arbitrate
Law 75 claim in Tennessee).
"' See Stephen B. Goldberg, et. al. Arbitration, in DIsum REsOLUTION 189, 190-191 (1985)(citing the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules). The Federal
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principal must be consistent with his intentions to arbitrate. Where ac-
tions by the principal have been inconsistent with his intentions to arbi-
trate, courts have ruled that the principal had constructively waived his
rights to arbitration." 6
F. Constitutional Challenges
Due to the restrictive interpretation of the concept of just cause,
numerous challenges to the constitutionality of Law 75 have been
mounted both in the Puerto Rico Supreme Court as well as the U.S.
Supreme Court.67  All such challenges have failed." Finally, in
1983 the Puerto Rico Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute, placing the issue to rest."
Arbitration Act, supra note 163, makes contract covenants requiring arbitration specifically en-
forceable. Id at 190. And such agreements have been routinely upheld even in jurisdictions with
conflicting state laws. Id.
" Salamone, supra note 7, at 100. (citing Caribbean Ins. Serv., Inc. v. American Life As-
surance Co. of Florida, No. 83-1032, slip op. (1st Cir. Aug. 24, 1983)). In Caribbean Ins. Serv.,
the defendant-principal answered a complaint for unjust termination. At no time in the pleadings
did the defendant seek arbitration. The court held that the right to arbitration had been construc-
tively waived. Id. at 101.
" In Marina Indus., Inc. v. Brown Boveri Corp., 114 P.R. Dec. 64 (1983), the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge grounded on Due Process, Equal Protection,
and illegal taking of property. Cases challenging retrospective application of the Act have been
successful. Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 280. In Fornaris 423 F.2d at 567-68, the First
Circuit held that the statute could not be applied retrospectively. See also, Puerto Rico's Dealer's
Act, supra note 11, at 455. The Supreme Court in Fornaris indicated that a narrow interpretation
of the meaning of just cause might help to avoid constitutional questions. The Supreme Court re-
versed and directed the lower court to instruct the District Court to wait until the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court had ruled on the "local law question.- Id, (emphasis added). The Puerto Rico
Supreme Court refused to address the issue, and a decade passed before the Court finally upheld
the constitutionality of the law. Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 282.
" See, eg., Warner-Lambert Co., 101 P.R. Dec. 378; Merle v. West Bend Co., 97 P.R. Dec.
403 (1969); Pan American Computer Corp., 562 F. Supp. at 701 (the Act does not violate due
process because it is public policy to maintain the stability of the manufacturer/distributor con-
tractual relationship and prevent certain abuses); Ruiz v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 274 F.
Supp. 14 (D.P.R. 1967) (the Act did not violate equal protection or due process).
"s A constitutional challenge based on due process, equal protection and taking clauses of
the Puerto Rico Constitution was mounted in Marina Indus., 114 P.R. Dec. 64. The constitution-
ality of the statute was upheld on each ground. Id. at 80-86. In rejecting the constitutional at-
tacks, the Court held that the Act was not an arbitrary use of legislative powers, but was intend-
ed to balance the bargaining power between the principal and the distributor. Salamone, supra
note 7, at 74. The court also rejected the unconstitutional taking of property arguments and stat-
ed that the damages computation formula was a guideline and not a rigid equation. Id. Although
not all constitutional issues have been addressed by the courts, the major constitutional questions
clouding Law 75 seem to have been finally resolved. Id. at 75.
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IV. DRAFTING A DISTRIBUTION CONTRACT N ACCORDANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF THE
DEALERS' CONTRACTS ACT
As shown in the preceding discussion, companies planning to ex-
pand their operations to Puerto Rico cannot successfully enforce stan-
dard distributor agreements customarily used in the U.S because of the
restrictions on freedom of contract imposed by Law 75.'" To draft a
contract that will be enforceable under the Law 75, the principal must
understand the intent of the Act as well as its interpretation by the
courts. Once the scope of the Act is understood, the principal can draft
a distribution contract whose operative language complies with the re-
quirements of the law and will be enforceable in Puerto Rico.
A. Defining the Relationship
From the analysis of Puerto Rico Supreme Court cases, it is evi-
dent that the trend in the Puerto Rico Supreme Court is toward expand-
ing the scope of protection to relationships that would not normally fit
the standard definition of dealer or distributor."' A determination that
the grantee's activities fall under the Act's definition of a dealer has
major impact on the principal's course of action. Once a dealer relation-
ship is found, it cannot be impaired or terminated without just cause."
Also, the provisional and injunctive relief remedies available under the
Act" can vary depending on the type of relationship.74
'7 Some of this restrictions are: (1) broad definition of a "dealer," (2) restrictive definition of
"just cause", (3) restriction on enforcement of performance clauses, supra note 120; and (4) re-
striction on forum selection and choice of law, supra note 156.
"' Salamone, supra note 7, at 81. See also Lineas Aereas Costarricences, S.A., 682 F. Supp.
117 (an agent is covered under Law 75 when he is responsible for employing personnel at its
own expense, responsible for purchasing the necessary licenses, and where all business losses or
credit risks are the agent's sole responsibility); Cordova, 112 P.R. Dec. 797 (promoting and sell-
ing insurance contracts, constitutes a franchise relationship under Law 75); San Juan Merc., 108
P.R. Dec. 211 (exclusivity not a requirement to be considered a dealer); J. Soler Motors 108
P.R. Dec. 134 (non-exclusivity or reserved rights by the principal to sell directly does not re-
move the relationship from the Act's protection). But see Sudouest Import Sales Corp., 732 F.2d
14 (finding that representative was not a dealer because it did not handle product billings and
receipts and had limited involvement in sales and promotions); Mario . Franceschini, Inc., 591
F. Supp. 414 (not a dealer because it did not buy the equipment nor had the authority to fix
sales terms or perform billing). But see Computec Systems Corp. 599 F. Supp. at 828 n.7 (being
in charge of the dealership is a key requirement).
" Law 75, supra note 5, § 278a. See also Rodriguez Vidal, supra note 7, at 263. If the
principal/grantor terminates the dealer without just cause or impairs the contractual relationship,
he may be found liable for damages to the dealer. Law 75, supra note 5, § 278b.
'" The Act states:
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In resolving Law 75 disputes, the Puerto Rico courts apply the
principle of "substance over form."'" Thus, labels such as dealer, dis-
tributor, agent, etc., are not enough to distinguish the relationship be-
cause the courts will go beyond the definitions or written terms used to
describe the relationship and will examine the grantee's actual activities
and responsibilities."6 Accordingly, when drafting a distributor/dealer's
contract, the duties of the grantee must be described with clarity and
precision so that the substantive responsibilities and activities of the
grantee will fit the label that describes the relationship.
B. Non-Renewal and Contract Termination Provisions
1. Duration of the Agreement
As previously discussed, the Act not only invalidates contractual
restrictions on the length of the relationship," but also establishes that
a manufacturer cannot refuse to renew a distribution contract if the
In any litigation involving the termination of a distribution contract or any act that
undermines the established relationship between the principal or grantor and the distri-
butor, the court may, during the pendency of the litigation, grant any provisional rem-
edy or injunctive measure to order either or both parties to continue within the terms,
the relationship established by the contract, and or restrain from any act or omission
that undermines the relationship ....
Id § 278b-1
" See DeMoss, 493 F.2d 1012 (availability of temporary remedies or injunction is not sub-
ject to a showing of possibility of irreparable' damage); Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 682
F. Supp. 117 (neither the General Agent or the principal are entitled to a preliminary injunction.
In this manner, the parties may reach an agreement to arbitrate); Francisco Garraron, Inc., 559
F. Supp. at 408 (the temporary remedies established by the Act are to be given liberally in
accordance with the public policy considerations of the Act); Aybar v. F. & B. Manufacturing
Co., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 (D.P.R. 1980) (the court is authorized to grant a preliminary
injunction while the litigation is pending in order to compel the parties to maintain and abide by
their contractual obligations).
'" See Roberto Colon, 88 J.T.S. 102 (defining the factors that would be considered to classi-
fy the relationship as a -dealership" protected by the Act). See also Cordova & Simonpletri, 112
P.R. Dec. 797 (an insurance agent fell within the definition of dealer because of his promoting
and selling insurance contracts as a representative of the Insurance company); Lineas Aereas
Costarricences, S.A., 682 F. Supp. 117 (a sales agent responsible for creating and promoting the
market, and selling and closing sales contracts, is covered by Law 75); San Juan Merc., 108
P.R. Dec. 211 (taking the necessary steps to gain new consumers or create a market for a
product or service are activities within the scope of a dealer); But cf Mario R. Franceschini,
Inc., 591 F. Supp. 414 (enterprise cannot be deemed a dealer where it does not purchase equip-
ment sold by the principal, nor is empowered to set sale conditions).
" See id.
" See Law 75, supra note 5, § 278a.
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dealer/distributor desires to continue the relationship."" Nevertheless,
good drafting practices can avoid a contract of indefinite duration.'"
The distribution contract should be drafted for a definite fixed term
with an automatic termination upon expiration of such term. Also, be-
cause the courts have upheld the termination or non-renewal of a con-
tract in those cases where the principal wanted to completely withdraw
from the market," the option to rely on market conditions as a justifi-
cation for non-renewal or termination and the attendant reservation of
rights by the principal must be expressly covered in the agreement. The
covenant should state that the principal and the dealer/distributor agree
that the contract may be terminated in the event that the distributor
completely withdraws from the marketplace.
2. Notice Requirements
The dealership or distribution contract should impose affirmative
duties on the dealer/distributor desiring to continue the relationship upon
normal expiration of the term. These affirmative duties will shift the
burden of initiating the renewal process to the dealer/distributor, and
failure by the dealer/distributor to do so may enable the principal to
refuse to renew the contract."' The method of termination, the time
period and method for giving notice of termination or non-renewal,
should be discussed. Also, the contract must explicitly require the
' See supra note 121.
' Contracts of indefinite duration are unpredictable and not favored by the courts. Herold,
supra note 11. See also King, supra note 11, at 101.
- See Medina & Medina, 858 F.2d at 824 (citing the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico), (Law
75 does not bar the principal from withdrawing from the market provided that his action is not
aimed at capitalizing on the good will or customer base created by the dealer).
.. In Law 75 actions, the courts have upheld the validity and enforceability of affirmative
requirements placed on dealers/distributors as a pre-condition for renewal of a distribution con-
tract. Nike International, Ltd., v. Athletic Sales, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1235 (D.P.R. 1988). In Nike,
the manufacturer asserted that the distribution contract had expired because of the distributor's
failure to give notice of his desire to renew the term of the contract, as required in the contract
terms. Id. The distributor claimed that the renewal clause was void because it violated public
policy. The court held that a clause requiring the distributor to give written notice to the
principal of his desire to renew the contract was enforceable. IL at 1239. The court reasoned
that although Law 75 prohibits the principal from refusing to renew a distribution contract with-
out just cause, the provision does not apply where the dealer/distributor, after having agreed to
comply with pre-renewal notice requirements, fails to do so. Id at 1247. Accordingly, the court
held that the principal could not be liable for the distributor's acts or omissions. Id. See also
Castillo v. Smart Products, 289 F. Supp. 138 (D.P.R. 1968) (dealers/distributors have the right to
rescind a distributorship agreement. Accordingly, Law 75 cannot invalidate contractual covenants
that establish procedures for the distributor to extend the contract beyond a given date, if it so
desires).
19931
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L
dealer/distributor to notify the principal within a fixed period of time
prior to expiration of the contract of his desire to continue the relation-
ship." The initial intentions of the parties regarding duration of the
contract must be clear from the writing, not left to interpretation at the
time of a termination or non-renewal dispute. 3
C. Defining Grounds for Termination
In finding just cause for termination, the courts focus only on sub-
stantial breaches that adversely and substantially affect the principal or
grantor. Accordingly, it is important not only to define the
dealer/distributor actions which would give rise to termination or non-
renewal of the contract, but also to thoroughly and immediately docu-
ment dealer/distributor conduct which violates any of the contract provi-
sions.
1. Performance Objectives and Quotas
As discussed, termination for poor performance is not a justifiable
defense for the principal/grantor to employ in unjust contract termination
actions. In its defense against termination for failure to meet perfor-
mance quot,.s or objectives, the dealer will most likely argue that dimin-
ished performance is not a substantial breach or in the alternative that
the quotas are unreasonable for the marketplace as it existed at the time
of the alleged non-performance."U The Act specifies, and the courts
have affirmed, that the burden of proof to demonstrate that those con-
"' In Nike Int'l Ltd., 689 F. Supp. at 1235, the court upheld the enforceability of the fol-
lowing contract clause:
Should distributor wish to extend the term of this Agreement, distributor shall notify
NIKE in writing of such desire not later than . . . whereupon the parties shall com-
mence, within a reasonable time thereafter, good faith negotiations regarding the exten-
sion of the agreement. If the parties fail to reach an agreement by . . . , there shall
be no further obligation to negotiate and this agreement shall expire in its normal
termination date.
Id at 1239.
'" Contracts must be performed according to their covenants "pursuant to the codified doc-
trine of pacta sunt servanta (agreements must be respected). P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 2994.
Cassera Foods, Inc. v. E.L.A., 108 P.R. Dec. 850 (1979) (emphasis added). The freedom of con-
tract is limited by Puerto Rico Law only in those circumstances that violate public policy, mor-
als or the law. Grisson v. Colotti, 644 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D.P.R. 1986). For a detailed discus-
sion on the various jurisdiction's interpretation of non-renewal and termination provisions, see
Faruki, supra note 11, at 933.
'" See supra note 119.
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tract clauses are reasonable is on the manufacturer or principal.',
Thus, it is essential that poor dealer performance be routinely document-
ed from the outset to establish that it is not being used by the principal
as a pretext for contract termination" since the courts are not likely to
accept allegations of poor performance that arise at the time when the
relationship starts to go sour . "
Sales quotas are essential elements of a dealer/distributor contract.
The principal or grantor must be prepared to show that quotas were
established in good faith and reflect the existing market conditions, com-
petition, ability of the principal to deliver and ability of the dealer to
meet his commitment, as relied on at the time of the contract.m To
establish poor performance by the dealer, the principal or grantor must
demonstrate that: (1) the requirements, quotas, performance objectives,
etc, were clearly established and agreed upon by the dealer/distributor at
the time of execution of the contract; (2) the quotas or performance
objectives were computed in good faith and are reasonable for the mar-
ket conditions at the time of the alleged non-performance;"9 and (3)
the dealer/distributor had been receiving adequate and timely written
notifications regarding his performance and warnings regarding the con-
sequences for failure to improve.
The Puerto Rico courts have not accepted allegations of poor per-
formance where the duties of the dealer/distributor were not clearly
spelled out and agreed to by him, and where the above conditions had
not been met."9 Therefore, if renewal of the contract is dependent on
dealer performance, meeting objectives, or compliance with any other
requirements, it must be made clear in the writing. Failure to renew, or
the termination of the contract due to the dealer not performing as re-
quired by the principal will be deemed "termination without just
t' Id.
" Claim of just cause for termination cannot be supported by alleging unsatisfactory perfor-
mance at the time of answering the complaint and without the evidence to support the claim. La
Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d at 4.
A L at 3 (holding that there was no just cause for termination despite the principal's
claims of poor performance).
" IdL Performance objectives and quotas should be established at the outset of the contract
and in good faith. Salamone, supra note 7, at 106. The contract should also include some meth-
od for revising the quota to reflect the changing market conditions. Id.
'" See Salamone, supra note 7, at 106. Failure to meet the quota does not establish a prima
facie case. The principal or grantor must show that the contract was reasonable and that it in-
cluded provisions for ongoing revision and adjustment of quotas to reflect changing market con-
ditions. L See also La Playa Santa Marina, Inc., 597 F.2d at 1.
" In La Playa Santa Marina, 597 F.2d at 3, the court noted that prior to issuing the notice
of termination to the dealer, the distributor had at no time expressed its dissatisfaction with the
dealer performance.
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cause' 19' unless it is clear from the writings at the inception of the
contract that the intention of the parties was to terminate or not renew
the contract for failure to perform as agreed, and the agreed upon objec-
tives reflected the intention of the parties.
The above standard, as many unfortunate principals have found, is
not easy to meet. Therefore, a better alternative to setting quotas or
performance objectives is to require that the dealer purchase and prepay,
or guarantee payment for, a specified amount of product as a condition'
for maintaining the distributorship contract. In the alternative, a clause
could be included providing for remedies in the form of quantity
pricing"9 and bill-backs 9' when the distributor fails to purchase the
minimum amount of product required by the contract. If the
dealer/distributor fails to purchase the required amounts at the higher
prices, or fails to pay for the bill-backs when invoiced, the principal
would have a valid cause for termination."9
2. Reservation of Rights to Make Changes in the Course of
Dealing
It is critical to discuss within the contract the non-exclusivity of the
relationship and to state clearly that the grantor reserves the right to
appoint additional dealers/distributors/agents, and that the grantee recog-
nizes this principal's right and has planned its business strategy accord-
ingly. The writing of this section must clearly indicate the intention of
the parties as they existed at the time of execution of the contract.
D. Arbitration Clauses, Choice of Law and Forum Selection
As discussed above, arbitration clauses are routinely enforced and
cannot be preempted by Puerto Rico law. 9 Accordingly, a covenant
... l at 1-3. Tamachi, Inc., 651 F. Supp. at 1360, n.1 (principal cannot undermine contrac-
tual relationship with distributor); General Office Products Corp., 666 F. Supp. at 331 (inactivity
by a manufacturer, after being notified of third party interferences with the distributor's exclusive
contract constitute impairment of the relationship).
" In quantity pricing arrangements the dealer/distributor discounts are low initially and in-
crease as purchase volume increases.
'n In the bill-back arrangement, the dealer/distributor receives the dealer discount based on a
predetermined purchase level. If the purchase level is not met, the discount level changes to that
of a lower quantity level and the dealer/distributor is invoiced (billed-back) for the excess dis-
counts received.
"' See P.P.M. Chemical Corp., 931 F.2d 138 (dealer's continual violation of payment terms
constitutes a material breach of the contract); Biomedical Instrument & Equip., 797 F.2d 16
(dealer's failure to pay on time the amounts due constitutes a violation of one of the essential
obligations of the contract).
" Arbitration agreements are enforceable "as a matter of federal law." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S.
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stating that all disputes arising from the contract must be resolved by
arbitration should be included. This covenant must also specify the
choice of law and forum for arbitration." Parties wishing to arbitrate
usually turn to the American Arbitration Association for assistance in
administering the hearing, providing procedural rules, and selecting an
arbitrator."9 Therefore, for guidance in drafting the arbitration clause,
the drafter should refer to the "Standard Broad Form Clause" of the
American Arbitration Association."' Even if this arbitration clause is
included in the agreement,"9 the principal must reaffirm by his actions
his intent to arbitrate so as not to waive his right to arbitration.' °
Conduct or stipulations incompatible with the pursuance of arbitration
remedies may be considered a constructive waiver of arbitration."'
CONCLUSION
The appointment of a dealer/distributor in Puerto Rico by a U.S. or
foreign principal/grantor may trigger the application of Law 75. This
law has created a protectionist environment that benefits dealers, dis-
tributors, franchisees and agents to the detriment of the unwary principal
or grantor. As the law has evolved, Puerto Rican distributors, through
strong lobbying activities, have obtained amendments to the Act which
have closed off loopholes and further strengthened their position. Al-
though these restrictions seriously impair the principal's freedom of
contract, they have been upheld by both the Puerto Rico courts and the
U.S. federal courts applying Puerto Rico law.' Foreign or U.S. main-
land manufacturers are usually not aware of the on-going changes in
at 626.
" This clause must clearly reflect the intention of the parties to submit all their disputes to
arbitration. The strong federal policy towards arbitration will enforce these covenants and will not
attempt to second guess or rewrite the contract. See Luis Rosario, 733 F.2d 172.
t Goldberg, supra note 165, at 190.
' Some of the items that should be included in the arbitration clause are: (1) procedure for
initiating the arbitration process; (2) selection of arbitrators; (3) rules of decision (majority or
concurrence by all); (4) form, scope and time of award; and (5) fees. Id. at 192-195. In addi-
tion, a clause must be included stating that "[p]arties to these Rules shall be deemed to have
consented that judgment upon the arbitration award may be entered in any Federal or State Court
having jurisdiction thereof." Id at 190.
"' Under American Arbitration Rules, the party initiating the arbitration process must give
notice to the other party of its intention to arbitrate. d at 192. The initiating party must file
with the Regional Office of the American Arbitration Association three copies of the notice and
three copies of the agreement to arbitrate. Id.
See supra note 166.
"' See Caribbean Insurance Serv., Inc. Assurance Company of Florida, 715 F.2d 17 (a prin-
cipal or grantor can constructively waive his right to arbitrate with his actions). Salamone, supra
note 7, at 100.
m Pan American Computer Corp., 562 F. Supp. at 696.
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Law 75 until it is too late. 3 Therefore, an understanding of the cur-
rent state of Law 75 and its effect on the contemplated relationship can
reduce the principal's exposure to unnecessary and expensive litigation.
The inclusion of the clauses discussed above will also provide the prin-
cipal with some added measure of protection under Law 75.
As shown, Law 75 has been a source of extensive litigation and a
great deal of controversy.' Most of the litigation has centered around
three key areas: (1) what relationships fall under Law 75's definition of
"dealership"; (2) what reasons for termination of a distribution relation-
ship fall within the meaning of "just cause"; and (3) what contract cov-
enants are not enforceable under Law 75. These issues must be ad-
dressed in the drafting of any distribution, dealership, franchise or agen-
cy contract aimed at the Puerto Rico market if the contract is to survive
scrutiny under Law 75. The goal of the contract should be to structure
the relationship so as to reflect the original intention and expectations of
the parties and to facilitate the termination of the relationship without
running afoul of the Act if those expectations are not met.
This note has attempted to provide background and analysis of Law
75 as well as a set of recommendations on the areas that need addition-
al attention when drafting a distributorship, dealership or agency contract
under Law 75. These recommendations are intended to highlight areas
that need special attention when drafting a distributorship, dealership or
agency contract, to insure that it will be enforceable under the Puerto
Rico Dealers' Contract's Act. They should supplement the covenants
and business considerations usually included in most sound distributor-
ship agreements. If implemented, these recommendations should assist a
principal or grantor in avoiding the pitfalls of Puerto Rico's Dealer's
Contract Act.
Richard M. Krumbein"
A Different Opinion, supra note 11, at 632.
Commentators believe that the Act will continue to generate more lawsuits and more con-
troversy unless the law is amended in the near future to resolve the potential constitutional is-
sues and more clearly define who is a protected dealer. Salamone, supra note 7, at 111-112. In
fact, prominent experts in Law 75 litigation have warned that the Act could have serious adverse
consequences to Puerto Rico consumers and distributors. A Different Opinion, supra note 7, at
632. Furthermore, multinational corporations, once they become aware of the effects of the Act
on the cost of doing business in Puerto Rico, may have second thoughts before embarking on a
distribution venture with a Puerto Rican distributor. Id.
" J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1993).
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